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ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS TO DEVISE OR
BEQUEATH AFTER THE DEATH OF
THE PROMISOR*
By BaRTEL M. SPARKs**
The problems involved in the enforcement of contracts to devise
or bequeath after the death of a defaulting promisor are numerous,
diverse, and often paradoxical in their appearance. Whether a
question of probate, of property, or of contract is presented remains
unanswered in too many instances. Failure to answer this initial
inquiry is sometimes the only explanation for apparently conflict-
ing decisions. This article is an effort to analyze these varied prob-
lems with a view of charting a reasonably safe course to be pur-
sued by the disappointed promisee seeking his remedy after the
promisor's death. For the purposes of this discussion a valid con-
tract and a breach by the promisor are assumed; consequently,
problems relating to the formation of such contracts and the means
which may be adopted within the lifetime of the promisor to pro-
tect the various interests involved are omitted.
Effect of Contract on Probate
According to the accepted interpretation of a probate proceed-
ing, the probate of a will is the establishment of a particular thing
as the last will and testament of a definite person. The legal effect
or operation of the will is of no concern. Whether or not the testa-
tor has violated some obligation by making the will or whether or
not there is any property upon which the will can operate are
matters beyond the scope of an action to secure admission to
probate.
All the above propositions appear to be well established and
are often stated as truisms. However, as soon as a contract for a
testamentary disposition enters the picture, courts and commen-
tators alike have a tendency to forget the truisms they have been
enunciating and begin to treat probate as something more than a
*This article is based upon a section of a thesis written in partial fiil-
fillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree at the University of Michi-
gan Law School.
**Professor of Law, New York University.
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mere proceeding to decide what is the will. The first effort in this
direction was made at an early date in the development of the con-
tractual will concept. A will made pursuant to contract and a sub-
sequent, inconsistent will were both offered for probate. In favor of
the earlier will it was urged that it was the last legal will, that by
entering into the contract the testator disabled himself from mak-
ing any testamentary disposition not in harmony with the contract.
It was sought to draw an analogy between the position of a promisor
under a contractual obligation to make a particular testamentary
disposition and that of a married woman without capacity to make
a will without the consent of her husband. These arguments were
rejected and the most recent will was admitted to probate even
though its effect was to revoke the prior will made pursuant to the
contract.1 A similar result was reached in this country at a reason-
ably early date in the history of contracts to devise or bequeath.
2
This same position-has been adopted by a clear majority of the
courts in which the question has been raised3 although an apparent
misunderstanding of the nature of probate has led to an opposite
result in some cases. Relying upon an earlier decision which gave
a promisee an entirely different remedy 4 the Alabama court has
denied probate to the testator's most recent will and accepted an
earlier will made pursuant to contract.5 The same principle has
received some recognition elsewhere6 and apparently has its foun-
1. Pohlman v. Untzellman, 2 'Lee 319, 161 Eng. Rep. 355 (1756).
2. Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N. E. 1151 (1892).
3. In re Carpentier's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 33, 285 Pac. 348 (1st Dist.
1930) ; In re Rolls' Estate, 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924) ; Manrow v.
Deveney, 109 Ind. App. 264, 33 N. E. 2d 371 (1941) ; It re Estate of Adkins,
161 Kan. 239, 167 P. 2d 618 (1946) ; In re Hirschhorn's Estate, 76 N. Y. S.
2d 344 (Surr. Ct. 1947), affd, 273 A.pp. Div. 852,, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 152 (1948) ;
In re Gudewicz' Will, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 838 (Surr. Ct. 1947) ; Schley v. Donlin,
olson here
131 Misc. 208, 225 N. Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Morgan v. Sanborn,
225 N. Y. 454, 122 N. E. 696 (1919) ; In re Hermann's Will, 178 App. Div.
182, 165 N. Y. Supp. 298, aff'd, 222 N. Y. 564, 118 N. E. 1062 (1917) ; Van
Vlack v. Van Vlack, 181 Ore. 646, 182 P. 2d 969, rehearing denied, 185 P.
2d 575 (1947) ; Shawver v. Parks, 239 S. W. 2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ;
Pullen v. Russ, 209 S. W. 2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948; Hobson v. Black-
burn, 1 Add. 247, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822) ; see In re Berry's Estate, 195
Cal. 354, 233 Pac. 330 (1925); Norris's Estate, 329 Pa. 483, 198 Atl. 142(1938).
4. Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 2 So. 624 (1886) (awarding relief
in the nature of specific performance).
5. Walker v. Yarbrough, 200 Ala. 458, 76 So. 390 (1917). An earlier
decision denying an injunction against probate of a will revoking a prior
will made pursuant to contract, Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771(1906), was left undisturbed.
6. Hatcher v. Sawyer, 243 Iowa 858, 52 N. W. 2d 490 (1952) (injunc-
tion against probate of inconsistent will sustained); Sherman v. Goodson's
Heirs, 219 S. W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (intermediate court decision
of doubtful authority even in the jurisdiction where decided); see In re
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dation in the misguided notion that since the contract is valid and
may be enforced at law or in equity it is merely prolonging litiga-
tion to deny complete relief in the probate court.7
Probate remedies demanded in cases where the actual wrong
is a breach of contract take a variety of forms. Where a will
made pursuant to contract was burned by the testator in the pres-
ence of witnesses and with the expressed intention of revoking it
equity directed its probate as a destroyed will." One court has re-
fused to probate a will inconsistent with a contract even though
there never was a will pursuant to the contract and the result of
the court's action was intestacy of the decedent.9 On the other hand
it has been held that the promisee of the contract is not a proper
party to contest the inconsistent will.10 This would appear to be the
better result. Probate courts are usually without either the machin-
ery or the jurisdiction for determining the validity of contracts, and
if they make such determinations their findings are not res judicata
in subsequent actions at law or in equity." A problem of no small
consequence is suggested by Bray v. Cooper'2 where the last will
was admitted to probate but with a restriction that it would be void
and unenforceable as to those parts inconsistent with a previous
contract. Where the contract covers only part of the estate the
McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478, 101 AtI. 807 (1917) (remanded for a jury
determination of whether or not there was a contract). In an intermediate
court case where no final determination could be reached because the con-
tract was not sufficiently proved, California has indicated that a will incon-
sistent with a prior contract could not be probated. Estate of Crawford, 69
Cal. App. 2d 607, 160 P. 2d 64 (2d Dist. 1945). However, in view of other
cases in that state it seems to be reasonably safe to assume that the last will
can be probated there regardless of any previously executed contract. In re
Carpentier's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 33, 285 Pac. 348 (1st Dist. 1930) ; In re
Roll's Estate, 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924) ; see In re Berry's Estate,
195 Cal. 354, 233 Pac. 330 (1925). At least one court has gone so far as to
set aside probate of a will revoking a prior will made pursuant to a contract
Frazier v. Patterson, 243 I1. 80, 90 N. E. 216 (1909).
7. This same theory has been vigorously asserted by a few com-
mentators. Goddard, Muttual Wills, 17 Mich. L. Rev. 677 (1919). But it would
appear that the better view is contra. Atkinson, Wills § 48 (2d ed. 1953) ; 4
Page, Wills § 1709 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
S. Jordan v. McGrew, 400 Ill. 275, 79 N. E. 2d 622 (1948).
9. Estate of Doerfer, 100 Colo. 304, 67 P. 2d 492 (1937). The decision
was based upon a provision of the Colorado Statutes which authorizes will
contests based, not only upon objections raising an issue as to whether the
writing in question is the last will, but also "objections to the legality of the
contents of such will." Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 176, § 63 (1935). Even under each
a statute as this it might well be questioned whether the existence of a con-
tractual obligation removing property from the effective operation of a will
should be regarded as rendering the will illegal.
10. Winter's Estate, 34 Del. Co. 12 (Pa. Orph. 1945).
11. Fuller v. Nelle, 12 Cal. App. 2d 576, 55 P. 2d 1248 (1st Dist. 1936)
Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N. W. 699 (1893).
12. 145 Kan. 642, 66 P. 2d 592 (1937).
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situation can easily be imagined where two wills would have to be
probated with much resulting confusion. In fact this might well be
the result in almost every case since the mere appointment of a new
executor should be sufficient to give some validity to the new will.
The short cut sought to be achieved by making contract litiga-
tion a part of the probate procedure is likely to prove an expensive
short cut. The real contest in such cases would almost always be
over the validity of the contract, a matter with which probate courts
are usually not familiar. Of more serious consequence is the new
definition of a will that is inherent in such a procedure. An addi-
tional element would appear needed in the Wills Act. Not only
would it be necessary that the testator's wishes be in writing, signed
by the testator, attested by witnesses, etc., but there would be the
added requirement that those last wishes, however formally ex-
pressed, be not inconsistent with any previous contractual obliga-
tions of the testator. If this new requirement is found socially
desirable no doubt it should be incorporated into existing juris-
prudence, but it should be understood at the outset that it is a new
requirement loaded with a multitude of concepts new to the law
of wills.
The difficulty grows out of the tendency to unite the will and
the contract into one legal concept. An attempted union of such
basically opposite devices is to invite unnecessary confusion to say
the least. This fusion of thought has produced extremely peculiar
results in some instances. Any attempt to affirmatively compel the
execution of a will would appear destined to certain failure because
of the inherent difficulties involved in compelling such an act and
also because the very terms of the contract would necessarily imply
that the promisor had until the end of his life to perform. However,
once the will has been executed its revocation has been enjoined in
Indiana, 3 and dicta supporting the same proposition can be found
elsewhere.14 Without making any reference to this rather strange
decision Indiana has more recently held that it is the last will of a
decedent that is entitled to probate even though an earlier will has
13. Lovett v. Lovett, 87 Ind. App. 42, 155 N. E. 528, rehearing denicd,
87 Ind. App. 52, 157 N. E. 104 (1927), noted, 3 Ind. L. J. 242 (1927) ; 26
Mich. L. Rev. 464 (1928) ; 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 66 (1928) ; 1 U. of Cin. L. Rev.
498 (1928) ; 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 110 (1927). The same type of relief has
apparently been granted in Georgia. Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 28 S. E.
2d 255 (1943) (case decided on demurrer making it difficult to ascertain
whether or not this specific item of relief was granted).
14. See Elmer v. Elmer, 271 Mich. 517, 260 N. W. 759 (1935) ; Cobb v.
Hanford, 88 Hun 21 (N.Y. 1895) ; Ex parte Hineline, 166 S. C. 352, 164 S. E.
887 (1932).
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been executed pursuant to contract. 15 If it is the last will that must
be probated what would be the effect of the secret execution of a
revoking instrument in a case where there had issued an injunction
against revocation? What penalty could be imposed upon the dead
testator? It would appear that at the very best an injunction against
revocation is a vain thing and that real relief to the promisee must
be sought through some other means.
If a promisor'can be enjoined from revoking a will made pur-
suant to contract, it would seem that even where no such injunction
is sought probate of a subsequent inconsistent will could be enjoined.
Such a remedy has been granted in New York,"0 but it was more
recently denied there 7 and probably is not the law in that state at
the present time.' 8 The right to an injunction against probate of
the inconsistent will is recognized in Iowa'9 and possibly Cali-
fornia,20 but the better view would appear otherwise.2' The Iowa
doctrine was established when a bill in equity asked that title to the
decedent's real estate be established in the beneficiaries of the con-
tract and that a trust be impressed upon the personalty. The relief
was granted and then probate of the inconsistent will was enjoined
on the theory that it would constitute a cloud on title.22 The result
15. Manrow v. Deveney, 109 Ind. App. 264, 33 N. E. 2d 371 (1941).
16. Cobb v. Hanford, 88 Hun 21 (N.Y. 1895).
17. Matter of Martin's Will, 128 Misc. 659, 220 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Surr.
Ct. 1927), noted, 13 Va. L. Rev. 660 (1927).
18. An injunctive remedy of this sort would appear wholly incon-
sistent with the more recent New York cases which have sustained the
probate of the last will even though the effect was revocation of a prior con-
tractual will. In re Hirschhorn's Estate, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 344 (Surr. Ct.
1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 852, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 152 (1948) ; In re Gudewicz'
Will, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 838 (Surr. Ct 1947); Schley v. Donlin, 131 Misc. 208,
225 N. Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct 1927) ; Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 454, 122
N. E. 696 (1919).
19. Hatcher v. Sawyer, 243 Iowa 858, 52 N. W. 2d 490 (1952) ; Child
v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N. W. 316 (1939).
20. An injunction was granted in the lower court and no appeal was
taken. After the time for appeal had elapsed the will was offered for probate.
The supreme court sustained the denial of probate on the theory that it was
bound by the prior decree, but no position was taken as to the propriety of
the decree or what result would have been reached if an appeal had been taken
within the proper time. Matter of Estate of Chase, 169 Cal. 625, 147 Pac. 461(1915). It is very unlikely that such injunctive relief would be sustained in
California should the question arise in a proper case. Relief of this kind
would be wholly inconsistent with the cases in that jurisdiction refusing
to consider the existence of the contract ground for contest of probate of a
subsequent inconsistent will. In re Carpentier's Estate, 104 Cal. App. 33, 285
Pac. 348 (1st Dist. 1930) ; In re Rolls' Estate, 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608(1924) ; see In re Berry's Estate, 195 Cal. 354, 361, 233 Pac. 330, 333 (1925).
21. Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906); Matter of
Martin's Will, 128 Misc. 659, 220 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Surr. Ct. 1927), noted,
13 Va. L. Rev. 660 (1927) ; Dickerson v. Murfield, 183 Ore. 147, 191 P. 2d
380 (1948).
22. Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa 1205, 282 N. W. 316 (1939).
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is no more justified than would be a holding that probate of a will
would place a cloud on the title to adeemed property in any case
where there has been an ademption.
Another area in which failure to separate the will from the con-
tract can easily lead to confusion arises out of a contest of probate
of a will made in pursuance of a contract on the ground that the
promisee failed to perform his bargain. No definitive authority has
been found on this question but where the issue has been raised it
appears that counsel have treated the will and the contract as one
instrument the entirety of which must stand or fall together. -2 3 It
would seem that a more logical approach would be along the condi-
tional will theory with the argument that the effectiveness of the
will was conditional upon perfo-mance by the promisee. Unless this
condition were expressed in the will the contest would most likely
fail, for while extraneous evidence may be admitted to show lack
of testamentary intent24 such evidence of a conditional intent should
be denied.2 5
Closely related to the problem of the promisee's failure to per-
form is that of the mutual recission of the contract without a revoca-
tion of the contractual will. Here the will is entitled to probate, 8
23. Such contests have been undertaken but have been disposed of by
decisions that the promisees in fact: performed, thus leaving uncertainty as
to what would happen should there be a finding of nonperformance. In re
Berry's Estate, 195 Cal. 354, 233 Pac. 330 (1925) (containing dicta that non-
performance would be immaterial); In re Donaldson's Estate, 26 Wash.
2d 72, 173 P. 2d 159 (1946).
24. In re Watldn's Estate, 116 Wash. 190, 198 Pac. 721 (1921) ; Lister
v. Smith, 3 Sw. & Tr. 282, 164 Eng. Rep. 1282 (1863) ; 1 Jarman, Wills 30(8th ed. 1951) ; 1 Page, Wills § 53.
25. Sewell v. Slingluff, 57 Md. 537 (1882) ; Atkinson, Wills § 83 (2d
ed. 1953) ; 1 Page Wills § 92.
Contra: Some confusion concerning conditional wills centers around
two-party contracts that the survivor shall take the property of the first
to die. Here it is customary for each party to execute a will in favor of
the other. If the survivor neglects to change his will it has sometimes been
held that evidence of the contract will be admitted to show that the will was
conditional upon the testator's being the first to die, an event which failed to
happen. Maloney v. Rose, 224 Iowa 1071, 277 N. W. 572 (1938) ; Maurer v.
Johansson, 223 Iowa 1102, 274 N. W. 99 (1937); Anderson v. Anderson,
181 Iowa 578, 164 N. W. 1042 (1917) ; In re Estate of Reed, 125 W. Va. 555,
26 S. E. 2d 222 (1943) ; Wilson v. Starbuck, 116 W. Va. 554, 182 S. E. 539(1935).
For an excellent discussion of conditional wills generally see Evans,
Conditional Wills, 35 Mich. L. Rev. .1049 (1937).
26. In re Mortensen's Will, 157 Misc. 717, 284 N. Y. Supp. 420 (Surr.
Ct. 1936). Rescission of the contract could not be anything more than a
demonstration of intent to revoke, and a mere intent to revoke, regardless of
how clearly that intent is manifest, is not within itself a revocation. Atkinson,
Wills § 84 (2d ed. 1953).
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but it should be possible to impress a constructive trust in favor of
those who would take had the will been revoked.2 7
It is clear that the overwhelming weight of authority is that
probate of a will is not affected by the existence of a contractual
obligation on the part of the testator. Contrary authority can usually
be dismissed as a judicial accident or mistake not being followed
even in the jurisdiction where decided. This proposition is not
weakened by a case such as In re Gredler's Estate28 where it was
held that a statute invalidating a bequest to charity if the testator
died within thirty days after the execution of the will did not apply
to a charitable bequest made in performance of a previously existing
contract. The rationale there was, not that the contract as such had
any bearing on probate, but rather that the reason for the statute
did not exist in that case. The statute was designed to insure that
charitable gifts were the result of the free desires of testators with-
out the pressures and coercion brought on by the doubts and terrors
often associated with impending death. A testator who is merely
fulfilling a contractual obligation has no need for this protection.
Another situation in which a kind of probate recognition is
given to the existence of a contract without altering the proposition
that a contract for a testamentary disposition cannot affect the
probate of a will involves adoption contracts. Where a decedent
enters into a contract for the adoption of a minor child but dies
without ever completing the adoption process, the child is a proper
party to contest the decedent's will.2 9 This kind of recognition in-
volves nothing more than a determination of status. No adjudication
of property rights is sought. The would-be adopted child is merely
given the status of a contestant in the proceeding to probate the will
of his allegedly adoptive parent. He is permitted to raise any ques-
tions of fraud, undue influence, or other matters impugning a
proper execution. If the contest is successful a proceeding in equity
is still necessary to establish the child's right to inheritance. There is
some authority that this probate recognition of a contract for the
purpose of determining status should be denied and that the child
27. The establishment of a constructive trust here would be found
more difficult than in the case of a promisor who died while the contract
was still in effect but without the agreed will. In the rescission case the
beneficiary of the alleged constructive trust would be a mere volunteer and
the beneficiary of the unrevoked will would be innocent of any fraud or other
wrongdoing. However, the transfer by the unrevoked will should be regarded
as a transfer by mistake and a remedy provided on the theory of unjust
enrichment.
28. 361 Pa. 384, 65 A. 2d 404 (1949).
29. In re Biehn's Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P. 2d 1112 (1933); In re
Stoiber's Estate, 101 Colo. 192, 72 P. 2d 276 (1937) ; Ezell v. Mobley, 160 Ga.
872, 129 S. E. 532 (1925).
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should not be permitted to contest the will until after he has pro-
ceeded in equity and obtained a decree of quasi-adoption. 30
Even in jurisdictions where probate courts are given extensive
equity powers there is sound reason for keeping the contract and
the will separate. Until a new dimension is added to the Wills Act
it must be the last will that is admitted to probate regardless of any
contractual obligations that might exist. As soon as a different
result is reached the formalities characterizing a testamentary act
will have lost their significance. This is not to say a probate court
could not, through an accounting procedure or otherwise, supervise
the administration of decedents' estates in many instances in a
way to permit an actual distribution in accordance with the terms
of the contract.3 ' Of course when the personal representative suc-
ceeds to the estate of the deceased he takes it subject to whatever
burdens or encumbrances that exist against it. A contract to devise
or bequeath creates an equitable right in the promisee. That equit-
able right in the promisee constitutes an encumbrance or burden
upon the estate and may be asserted by filing a claim in the probate
court in the usual manner prescribed for the filing of ordinary
claims against a decedent's estate.3 2 This type of procedure does
not question the admission of the last will to probate. It is a claim
against the estate and if recognized might have the effect of con-
suming part or all the property before the provisions of the will are
applied to it. Whether the claim is allowed33 or denied 3' an appeal
30. A New York court has strongly indicated that a mere contract for
adoption cannot give the would-be adopted child any status whatever to
contest the will of the allegedly adoptive parent in that state. However,
this cannot be regarded as anything more than dicta since in the case in
which it was pronounced the contract: had actually been made with the decedent's
husband, the decedent not being made a party to it In re Bamber's Estate, 147
Misc. 712, 265 N. Y. Supp. 798 (Surr. Ct 1933). See also the dissenting
opinion in Ezell v. Mobley, 160 Ga. 872, 882, 129 S. E. 532, 538 (1925).
31. Schley v. Donlin, 131 Misc. 208, 225 N. Y. Supp. 453 (Sup. Ct
1927) : In re Kocher's Estate, 354 Pa. 81, 46 A. 2d 488 (1946). A statute
granting rather extensive legal and equitable powers to a probate court might
give the court power to settle the contract rights through an accounting pro-
cedure or some other appropriate action, but it does not authorize probate
of a revoked contractural will. In re Lamerdin's Estate, 157 Misc. 431, 284
N. Y. Supp. 608 (Surr. Ct 1935) ; In re Higgins' Estate, 148 Misc. 30, 266
N. Y. Supp. 503 (Surr. Ct 1933).
32. Merchants Nat Bank of Mobile v. Cotnam, 250 Ala. 316, 34 So. 2d
122 (1948) ; Appeal of Spurr, 116 Conn. 108, 163 Ati. 608 (1933) ; Downing
v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, .318 Ill. 323, 149 N. E. 256 (1925) ; In re
Wert's Estate, 165 Kan. 49, 193 P. 2d 253, aff'd on rehearing, 166 Kan.
159, 199 P. 2d 793 (1948) ; Sard v. Sard, 147 Me. 46, 83 A. 2d 286 (1951) ;
Kalscheuer v. Cooke's Estate, 207 Minn. 437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940) ; In re
Schoenbachler's Estate, 310 Pa. 396, 165 AtI. 505 (1933); Ellis v. Cary, 74
Wis. 176, 42 N. W. 252 (1889).
33. Appeal of Spurr, supra note 32; Downing v. Harris Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, supra note 32 : In re Schoenbachler's Estate, supra note 32; Dilger
v. McQuade's Estate, 158 Wis. 328, 148 N. W. 1085 (1914).
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may be taken and since the right of trial to a jury exists in either
event35 the usual result is a trial de novo. Although this proceeding
originates in the probate court the right the promisee seeks to
enforce is recognized as a claim in contract and is handled as such
without any effort to interfere with the normal administration of
the estate or to alter testamentary formalities by the introduction of
contractual innovations.
If the promisee is permitted to file exceptions to the executor's
inventory, a probate court exercising equity powers might be
capable of granting relief upon the contract in this manner without
disturbing probate of an inconsistent will. The purpose of such a
bill of exceptions is to correct the inventory by seeing that it ac-
curately reflects the items of property included in the decedent's
estate and excludes items not within his estate and not subject to
administration. It would seem quite proper to exclude property
which belonged to the exceptor as beneficiary of a trust. The critical
question is whether the court can exercise its equity power to de-
clare a constructive trust in favor of the promisee in a hearing on
exceptions to an inventory. Such action by a probate court has been
sustained,38 but it has also been denied on the ground that a hearing
on exceptions cannot be used as a substitute remedy for the im-
pression of a constructive trust.3 7 The most serious objection is that
such a hearing is a summary proceeding unsuited to the remedy
sought.
Although relief to the disappointed promisee might be available
in the probate court in a few limited situations, it should be re-
membered that the ultimate wrong is breach of contract and that a
breach of contract is not an appropriate ground for either granting
or refusing probate to a will. This is far more than a mere formal
requirement. It is a requirement dictated by the basic Anglo-
American concept of a will. To insist upon it does not in any way
deny the validity of contracts to devise or bequeath. It does leave
the parties to such contracts to their appropriate legal or equitable
relief without necessitating any change in the law of wills.
34. It re Wert's Estate, 165 Kan. 49, 193 P. 2d 253, aff'd on rehearing,
166 Kan. 159, 199 P. 2d 793 (1948) ; Kalscheuer v. Cooke's Estate, 207 Minn.
437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940) ; Ellis v. Cary, 74 Wis. 176, 42 N. W. 252 (1889).
35. Appeal of Spurr, 116 Conn. 108, 163 Atl. 608 (1933); Downing
v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 318 Ill. 323, 149 N. E. 256 (1925); Dilger v.
McQuade's Estate, 158 Wis. 328, 148 N. W. 1085 (1914).
36. It re Barnes' Estate, 108 N. E. 2d 88 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1950),
aff'd, 108 N. E. 2d 101 (Ohio App. 1952).
37. In re Thrush's Estate, 76 Ohio App. 411, 64 N. E. 2d 839 (1945).
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Legal Remedies Available to the Promisee after the
Death of the Promisor
The fact that the performance contemplated by one of the
parties to a contract is the making of a will should not in and of
itself cause any variation in the legal remedies available in the event
of a breach. Failure to recognize this principle, together with the
effort that is often made to attach a peculiar significance to the will
element of the transaction, often hinders, or at least complicates,
the plaintiff's prospects for recovery when the agreed will is not
made. What is said here applies to a contract to leave property by
will. It should not be confused with the performance of services in
the hope that the person receiving the services will make testa-
mentary provision for the person rendering them.38 Neither should
it be identified with the rendering of services under circumstances
which lend themselves to an -mplication of a promise to pay.39
Where there is a contract to devise or bequeath and the prom-
isee fully performs on his part , if the promisor dies without fulfilling
his obligation an ordinary action at law for breach of contract will
lie.40 The action is for breach of contract by the deceased and should
be brought against the personal representative in the same way as
any other contract claim against the estate. The claim is assignable
and may be enforced in the name of the assignee.41 Ordinarily the
measure of damages will be the value of the thing promised by the
promisor.42 Where the thing promised is a specific sum of money
or a specific item of preperty the amount of damages is easy of
38. Davison v. Davison, 13 N. J. Eq. (2 Beasley) 246 (Ch. 1861);
Le Sage v. Coussmaker, 1 Esp. 187, 170 Eng. Rep. 323 (1794) ; Osborn v.
Governors of Guy's Hospital, 2 Strange 728, 93 Eng. Rep. 812 (1726).
Neither is it of any concern that the person receiving the services fully
intended to compensate for them by will. "In such action it must appear that
the services were rendered under an agreement to devise and not merely that
the decedent intended to make a will recognizing such services." Sneed's
Ex'r v. Smith, 255 Ky. 132, 137-138, 72 S. W. 2d 1028, 1031 (1934).
39. Lockwood v. Robbins, 125 Ind. 398, 25 N. E. 455 (1890) ; Kruse's
Adm'r v. Corder, 258 Ky. 774, 81 S. W. 2d 600 (1935); Ten Eyck v.
Pontiac, 0. & P. A. R. Co., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N. W. 905 (1889) ; 1 Williston,
Contracts §§ 36, 91A (rev. ed. 1938).
40. Where such an action is transferred to equity mandamus will issue
to compel a trial in the law court to protect the promisee's right to a trial byjury. Ex parte Simons, 247 U. S. 231 (1918).
41. Cullen v. Woolverton, 65 N. J. L. 279, 47 At. 626 (1900).
42. Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac. 542 (1920) ; Strakosch v. Con-
necticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 96 Conn. 471, 114 At. 660 (1921) ; Far-
rington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So. 2d 158 (1944) ; Gordon v. Spellman,
145 Ga. 682, 89 S. E. 749 (1916): Thompson v. Romack, 174 Iowa 155, 156
N. W. 310 (1916) ; Small's Adm'r v. Peters, 233 Ky. 576, 26 S. W. 2d 491(1930) ; Jenkins v. Stetson, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 128 (1864) ; Day v. Wash-
burn, 76 N. H. 203, 81 Atl. 474 (1911) (relief actually granted in equity);
Williams v. Buntin, 4 Tenn. App. 340 (1927).
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determination.4 3 If the promise is to give the entire estate or a
fractional part thereof an action at law is hardly the appropriate
remedy, but if that remedy is entertained the value of the thing
promised is still the measure of damages.44 The difficulty here is
with the remedy itself. Before the amount of damages can be fixed
the net value of the estate must be ascertained. 5 Since a jury is
not a satisfactory body to supervise an estate accounting the law
court should decline jurisdiction and transfer the case to equity
where the parties will find a forum more adapted to their needs.48
An interesting problem in construction is presented by a con-
tract to bequeath "all my personal estate," where the question
might well be raised whether or not the promisee is entitled to have
debts and costs of administration paid out of real estate. Although
there does not appear to be any clear judicial determination on the
point 47 the answer should depend upon the intent of the parties
and it is more probable that a gift of all personal property remaining
in the estate after the normal payment of debts and costs of adminis-
tration was intended.
Where the consideration given by the promisee consists of serv-
ices to the promisor, the emphasis sometimes placed upon the diffi-
culty involved in measuring the value of the services, 4 together
with what appears to be an occasional dictum to the effect that the
measure of damages is the value of the services rendered,49 tends
to create some misunderstanding. Such dicta are usually found in
cases denying recovery because the contract was inadequately
43. Newell v. Capelle, 14 F. Supp. 147 (D. Del. 1936), aff'd, 86 F. 2d
1007 (3d Cir. 1936) (holding action at law to be the only remedy available) ;
Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 Pac. 259 (1915) (action for specific per-
formance denied on the theory that an action at law for the sum promised
was the only remedy) ; Exchange Nat. Bank of Tampa v. Bryan, 122 Fla. 479,
165 So. 685 (1936) ; Halsey v. Snell, 214 N. C. 209, 198 S. E. 633 (1938).
44. Dilger v. McQuade's Estate, 158 Wis. 328, 148 N. W. 1085 (1914)(judgment for such sum as remained after debts and costs of administration
were paid).
45. Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489 (1914) ; In re Peterson,
76 Neb. 652, 107 N. W. 993 (1906), aff'd and explained on rehearing, 76 Neb.
661, 111 N. W. 361 (1907) ; Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N. W. 801
(1934).
46. In re Peterson, 76 Neb. 652, 107 N. W. 993 (1906), aff'd and ex-
plained on rehearing, 76 Neb. 661, 111 N. W. 361 (1907).
47. See Jenkins v. Stetson, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 128 (1864) (an opinion
involving a contract such as the one here under consideration but failing to
deal with the question of abatement between personalty and realty).
48. See Small's Adn'r v. Peters, 233 Ky. 576, 26 S. W. 2d 491 (1930).
49. In a case where specific performance was denied on the theory
that there was an adequate remedy at law it was indicated that in the action
at law the measure of damages would necessarily be the value of the services.
Simonson v. Moseley, 183 Minn. 525, 237 N. W. 413 (1931) (contract was
oral and involved real estate but Statute of Frauds was not relied upon as a
ground for the decision).
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proved,50 cases where the value of the services was the only remedy
sought,51 or where recovery upon the contract was impossible be-
cause of the Statute of Frauds or some similar rule. 2 However
prevalent such dicta may be, to state the proposition is to refute it.
To apply it would constitute a denial of the value of the bargain
and a definite impairment of the obligation of contract. 53
In Wisconsin a peculiar doctrine has emerged concerning con-
tracts in which the promisor agrees to compensate by will in con-
sideration of the promisee's foregoing his right to sue upon a pres-
ently existing claim. The contract is treated as one based upon a
past or executed consideration and the amount of recovery is limited
to the value of the previously existing claim regardless of the value
of the thing promised.54 The Wisconsin court has experienced
difficulty distinguishing the recovery granted in such cases from the
recovery denied in the case of an agreement to extend the time of
payment of a debt without altering the rate or amount.55 The court
has apparently failed to recognize that the embarrassing similarity
results, not from the contract itself, but from the erroneous interpre-
tation given the contract by 1:he court. The promisee certainly fore-
goes something when he abandons his right to sue on a present
claim, and the promisor certainly gains something of value when he
J s permitted continued use of his money until his death. These fac-
tors, and not the previous claim, constitute the true consideration
for the promisor's agreement to compensate by will, and there
should be no interference with the promisee's right to recover the
agreed price.5 6
If full performance by the promisee is prevented by the prom-
isor, the value of the thing contracted for may nevertheless be
recovered,57 except that from this measure of damages there should
50. Jones Estate, 359 Pa. 260, 261, 59 A. 2d 50, 51 (1948); Stichl~r
Estate, 359 Pa. 262, 263, 59 A. 2d 51 (1948).
51. Purviance v. Shultz, 16 Ind. App. 94, 95, 44 N. E. 766 (1896) (re-
covery also limited by the fact that no specific compensation was ever agrecd
upon); McAllister's Adm'r v. Bronaugh, 113 S. W. 821, 822 (Ky. 1908)(further recovery probably prevented by the Statute of Frauds though that
was not referred to in the opinion); Strubble v. Strubble, 42 Ohio App.
353, 354, 182 N. E. 48 (1932), noted, 9 Notre Dame Law. 361 (1934).
52. Rudd v. Planters Bank & Trust Co., 283 Ky. 351, 354, 141 S. W. 2d
299, 301 (1940).
53. See Frieders v. Frieders' Estate, 180 Wis. 430, 436, 193 N. W.
77, 79 (1923) (dissenting opinion).
54. Frieders v. Frieders' Estate, 180 Wis. 430, 193 N. W. 77 (1923,
Murtha v. Donohoo, 149 Wis. 41, 136 N. W. 158 (1912).
55. Id. at 485, 136 N. W. atl 159-160.
56. Halsey v. Snell, 214 N. C. 209, 198 S. E. 633 (1938) ; see Frieders
v. Frieders' Estate, 180 Wis. 433, 436, 193 N. W. 77, 79 (1923) (dissenting
opinion).
57. Jenkins v. Stetson, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 128 (1864).
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be deducted the estimated cost the promisee has saved to himself by
his nonperformance58 In order to be entitled to this remedy it is
necessary that the promisee remain in readiness to perform at all
times. Failure to do so might be construed as his own breach and
prevent his recovering even the value of any part performance
actually rendered. 9
Contracts to devise or bequeath are all too often informal ar-
rangements among relatives or close friends arrived at without the
advice of counsel. These arrangements evince a commendable de-
gree of mutual trust and confidence, but unfortunately it is a con-
fidence that is breached in a large number of cases. The promisee
who has faithfully performed his share of the bargain often finds
enforcement of his contract barred by the Statute of Frauds. In
such instances he may resort to an action at law, not to enforce the
contract, but to recover compensation for the benefits he has con-
ferred upon the promisor in reliance upon the oral agreement. The
action is in the nature of the common counts in assumpsit ;60 and
since the consideration given by the promisee is usually services
to the promisor, the count will most likely be in quantum meruit
where the value of the services rendered will be the measure of
damages.61 Interest on the amount recovered is calculated from the
date of judgment rather than from the date of the promisor's death
since no liquidated sum existed until judgment was rendered.62
Recovery for the reasonable market value of the services is per-
mitted even though the promisor has committed no legal wrong in
failing to perform an unenforceable contract.6 3 The services were
rendered in reliance upon the promisor's unenforceable agreement,
and a total denial of relief would result in an enrichment of the
estate to the detriment of the promisee.64
58. Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac. 542 (1920).
59. Jackson v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 310 Mass. 593, 39
N. E. 2d 85 (1942).
60. 2 Corbin, Contracts § 330 (1950).
61. Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir.
1917) ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 Pac. 84 (1920) ; Appeal of Spurr,
116 Conn. 108, 163 Ad. 608 (1933) ; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E.
666 (1886) ; Ruehl v. Davidson's Ex'r, 237 Ky. 53, 34 S. W. 2d 937 (1931) ;
DonoVan v. Walsh, 238 Mass. 356, 130 N. E. 841 (1921); Ellis v. Berry,
145 Miss. 652, 110 So. 211 (1926); Lemire v. Haley, 91 N. H. 357, 19 A.
2d 436 (1941) ; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N. C. 429, 45 S. E. 2d 764 (1947) ;
In re Anderson's Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A. 2d 301 (1944); Goodloe v.
Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767 (1905); Nelson v. Christensen, 169
Wis. 373, 172 N. W. 741 (1919).
62. Mussinon's Adm'r v. Herrin, 252 Ky. 495, 67 S. W. 2d 710 (1934).
63. Griffith v. Robertson, 73 Kan. 666, 85 Pac. 748 (1906) ; see generally
2 Corbin, Contracts § 327.
64. For an opinion emphasizing the equitable nature of the promisee's
claim and the unjust enrichmenf that would result if a remedy were not
provided, see Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933).
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Recovery in quantum meruit such as is described above should
not be confused with an action for damages for breach of the con-
tract where an entirely different measure of damages is demanded.
However, recovery in quantum meruit cannot be had unless the
contract even though oral, is proved. Proof of the contract usually
includes evidence of the value of the thing promised to be devised
or bequeathed. In the quantum meruit action such evidence is not
conclusive as to the amount of damages, but it does have some
probative value in that it is an indication of What the parties
themselves considered the services worth.65 That the jury should
receive testimony concerning the value of the thing promised for
any purpose is open to criticism on the ground that it is extremely
difficult for them to draw a distinction between using it as evidence
of reasonable compensation for services and evidence of an en-
forceable obligation.66 However, such evidence is so simliar to
declarations against interest it is difficult to justify its exclusion. If
the services rendered are of such a personal and intimate nature that
their value cannot be reasonably ascertained the value placed upon
them by the contract becomes the actual measure of damages.0 7
Of course there might well be circumstances other than the
Statute of Frauds in which recovery in quantum meruit can be had
upon an unenforceable contract. If a good faith performance is ren-
dered under a contract that is inequitable and unconscionable in
nature" or one in which events subsequent to its formation tend to
make its enforcement a violation of public policy 9 a quantum meruit
recovery may nevertheless be had. The same is true of a contract
whose terms are not sufficiently certain to be proved in other types
65. Settlemires v. Corum, 304 Ky. 105, 200 S. W. 2d 105 (1947) (evi-
dence primarily for the purpose of showing that the promisee had performed) ;
Ham v. Goodrich, 37 N. H. 185 (1858) ; Norton v. McLelland, 208 N. C.
137, 179 S. E. 443 (1935) ; Browne, Statute of Frauds § 126 (5th ed. 1880) ; 2
Corbin, Contracts § 328; 2 Williston, Contracts § 536 (rev. ed. 1936). The
value of the thing promised may be of such an uncertain quantity at the time
the contract is entered into that its probative force in the ascertainment of the
parties' estimate of the value of the services is neutralized. Where rather
indefinite services were rendered in exchange for a promise to leave the bulk
of an estate by will, it was held that evidence concerning the value of the
estate would have probative effect in determining the value of the services.Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir. 1917).
66. 4 Page, Wills § 1735.
67. Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S. W. 876 (1927);
Waters v. Cline, 121 Ky. 611, 85 S. W. 209 (1905). Cases of this type have
been erroneously cited for the proposition that evidence of the value of the
thing promised is not admissible unless the services performed are incapable
of valuation. 2 Corbin, Contracts § 328, n. 58.
68. Imthurn v. Martin, 150 Kan. 906, 96 P. 2d 860 (1940).
69. Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896).
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of actions.7 0 In each of these situations the promisee is permitted to
recover the actual value of a performance rendered in reliance upon
an unenforceable contract.
Recovery for the value of services rendered is also permitted
where the promise to compensate by will is no more definite than
that the promisee will be paid.71 It has been held that if a promisor,
after entering into such a contract, executes a will providing for
the promisee, that provision becomes the measure of damages even
though the will is later revoked.7 2 The rule was satisfactory in the
case in which it was announced, but it is assumed that this method
of estimating damages would not be binding upon a promisee seek-
ing to show that the provision in the revoked will was in fact too
small.
Comparatively few cases have been found involving a devise or
bequest to the promisee but not in accordance with the terms of the
contract; however, where the question has been raised, there is
little uniformity in the results reached. In Green v. Orgain3 it was
held that even though a will purporting to be the will of the
promisor and purporting to fulfill the obligation under the contract
was offered for probate the promisee could remain aloof from the
probate proceeding and bring action on his contract while the ques-
tion of probate was still pending. No harm resulted in the case con-
cerned since the paper offered was not properly executed and it ap-
peared certain that it could never be probated. However, the basis
for the decision, that is that the promisee can disclaim his rights
under the will in any case and enforce the contract, seems more
doubtful. If the will were admitted to probate and if it did contain
a provision in strict compliance with the contract a renunciation by
the promisee should be regarded as a refusal to accept a valid tender
of performance and should bar any further attempt on his part to
enforce the contract.
It has been held that the acceptance of a legacy by a promisee is
such an election as will bar an action on the contract even though
the legacy might be an inadequate or incomplete performance. 74
70. Moreen v. Carlson's Estates, 365 Ill. 482, 6 N. E. 2d 871 (1937);
Shakespeare v. Markham, 72 N. Y. 400 (1878) (uncertainty as to parties);
Graham v. Graham's Ex'rs, 34 Pa. 475 (1859) (uncertainty as to the thing
promised).
71. Succession of McNamara, 48 La. Ann. 45, 18 So. 908 (1896) ; Kal-
scheuer v. Cooke's Estate, 207 Minn. 437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940) ; Steffler v.
Schroeder, 12 N. J. Super. 243, 79 A. 2d 485 (App. Div. 1951).
72. In re McLean's Estate, 219 Wis. 222, 262 N. W. 707 (1935).
73. 46 S. W. 477 (Tenn. 1898).
74. Noyes v. Noyes, 233 Mass. 55, 123 N. E. 395 (1919) (an equitable
action enjoining further proceeding on a judgment previously obtained in an
action at law and emphasizing that the promisee could not accept the benefits
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Such a position is untenable and is out of harmony with the major-
ity opinion.75 Mere acceptance of a legacy is no indication of an
intent to accept it in complete performance of the obligation due
the promisee. The real question for decision is whether or not the
legacy should be credited toward payment of the contractual obliga-
tion so as to constitute a partial performance. Where the contract
was for a bequest of a sum of money and the will provided for only
a few small items of personal property, it was held that in an action
for damages the value of the items bequeathed would have to be
deducted from the sum contracted for.78 Likewise where a will was
executed and approved by the promisee as part of the transaction
forming the contract and a subsequent inconsistent will less favor-
able to the promisee was admitted to probate, it was held that the
measure of damages was the difference between the value of the
property included in the promised will and the value of that ac-
tually bequeathed.7 7 In two connected cases holding that a contract
,for services which does not fix the amount of compensation entitles
the promisee to recover the value of the services less any provision
actually made for him in the p romisor's will,7 s the concurring justice
seems to have pointed to a more satisfactory solution. His position
is that in every case where the promisee receives something from the
given him under the will and at thle same time enforce a judgment nullifying
substantial portions of its other parts.)
A New Jersey decision taking a similar position involved a contract for
services in which there was no specific provision as to the amount the promisee
should receive. The court held that a reasonable amount would be presumed
and that acceptance of the provision made by will estopped the promisee from
claiming more. Steffler v. Schroeder, 12 N. J. Super. 243, 79 A. 2d 485 (App.
Div. 1951). The case might not be regarded as authority in an action involving
a more definite promise. However, the better view is that even where the
promise is no more definite than that the promisee will be well paid, acceptance
of a legacy will not bar further -recovery where the legacy is less than the
reasonable value of the services rendered. Kalscheuer v. Cooke's Estate,
207 Minn. 437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940) ; Sidmore v. Allen, 207 Minn. 452, 292
N. W. 95 (1940).
75. Appeal of Spurr, 116 Conn. 108, 163 Atl. 608 (1933) ; Downing v.
Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 318 Ill. 323, 149 N. E. 256 (1925); Rizzo v.
Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16, 20 N. E. 2d 471 (1939) ; Kalscheuer v. Cooke's
Estate, 207 Minn. 437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940) ; Sidmore v. Allen, 207 Minn.
452, 292 N. W. 95 (1940) ; Jefferson v. Simpson, 83 W. Va. 274, 98 S. E. 212
(1919).
76. Ibid. (contract to bequea.th from $4,000 to $6,000 held to entitle the
promisee to at least $4,000).
77. Downing v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 318 Ill. 323, 149 N. E.
256 (1925).
See also Hudson v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678, 13 S. E. 583 (1891), where in an
action by a son on a contract wifl his father for the father's entire estate in
return for services the son was required to account for inter vivos gifts from
the father.
78. Kalscheuer v. Cooke's Estate, 107 Minn. 437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940)
Sidmore v. Allen, 207 Minn. 452, 292 N. W. 95 (1940).
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will there is raised a question of fact whether or not the testa-
mentary provision was intended as a performance of the contract or
as a gratuity."9 If a gratuity was intended, there is no sound reason
why the promisee should not accept his gift and still be permitted
to enforce his contract without abatement. This has been permitted
in actions to recover the value of services rendered in reliance upon
unenforceable contracts to devise specific real estate"° as well as
those to devise or bequeath all property owned by the promisor,8'
and the fact that the property left to the promisee by will actually
exceeds the value of the services makes no difference.8 2
If equitable defenses are permitted in actions at law, it is prac-
ticable in some instances to test the validity of a contract to devise
by action in ejectment. If, as is often the case, the promisee is left
in possession of the real estate at the promisor's death and the heirs
of the promisor seek to eject him he may offer the contract as an
equitable defense and counterclaim for specific performance.8 3 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has declared by way of dicta that
the promisee may enforce his contract by bringing his own action
in ejectment,8 4 but is doubtful if such a preceeding should be en-
tertained until the promisee has established his title through other
means.
Specific Performance and Other Equitable Remedies
In many instances actions at law provide satisfactory remedies
for breaches of contracts to devise or bequeath. However, the bulk
of the litigation in this field is found in chancery. Any inquiry into
why this is so raises many questions concerning the nature of the
rights and obligations created by such contracts. Is there some-
thing inherent in a contract to make a will that gives equity juris-
diction, or is there something peculiar about the social and economic
forces leading to the formation of such contracts which dictates
terms of the kind ordinarily dealt with in equity?
Probably the case that falls most clearly into equity jurisdiction
is that of the contract to devise a particular tract of real estate. Here
the analogy to the contract to convey real property is readily ap-
parent. If the grantee of a contract to convey Blackacre is entitled
79. Kalscheuer v. Cooke's Estate, 207 Minn. 437, 442, 292 N. W. 96,
97 (1940) (concurring opinion).
80. Appeal of Spurr, 116 Conn. 108, 163 Atl. 608 (1933).
81. Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass. 16, 20 N. E. 2d 471 (1939).
82. Appeal of Spurr, 116 Conn. 108, 163 Atl. 608 (1933).
83. Godine v. Kidd, 64 Hun 585, 19 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1892) ; Morrish v.
Price, 293 Pa. 169, 142 Atl. 137 (1928) ; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa. 310, 54
Atl. 24 (1903) ; Thrall v. Thrall, 60 Wis. 503, 19 N. W. 353 (1884).
84. Van Meter v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 140 Atl. 799, 800 (1935).
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to specific performance of his contract, it would seem to follow al-
most without question that some type of specific relief should be
given to the promisee of a contract to devise Blackacre. A difficulty
which must be faced at the outset is that by the time the contract to
devise is breached the promisor is dead and title to the property
concerned has devolved upon others. Whether this devolution takes
place by intestate succession or by devise, the persons receiving the
property find themselves with a title which would never have been
theirs but for the breach of contract by the decedent through whom
they must claim. Although the heirs or devisee concerned have
committed no wrong themselves if they are permitted to retain the
property, they will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the
promisee. If the contract is clearly proved, the Statute of Frauds is
satisfied, and relief is timely sought it is almost universally held that
a bill in equity will result in placing title in the promisee.8
The action to enforce a contract to devise is usually in the form
of a bill for specific performance and the relief given is usually a
decree that the heirs or devisees take legal title as constructive
trustees for the benefit of the promisee. Courts and commentators
alike often emphasize that this is not true specific performance. 8  It
is said that since it is a contract to make a will there can be no
breach until the promisor dies; consequently, no action will lie until
that time and a dead man cannot be compelled to execute a will.
This appears to be a pointless argument which ignores the very
nature of the transaction involved. The essential element is the
transfer of title at death. The execution of the will is merely the
vehicle through which the parties contemplated putting that transfer
into effect.8 7 When the promisor fails to perform his obligation,
85. Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S. W. 155 (1912); Keefe v.
Keefe, 19 Cal. App. 310, 125 Pac. 929 (1st Dist. 1912) ; Anson v. Haywood,
397 Ill. 370, 74 N. E. 2d 489 (1947) ; Kromar v. Kromar, 202 Iowa 1166, 211
N. W. 699 (1927) ; McDonald v. Scheifler, 323 Mich. 117, 34 N. W. 2d 573
(1948); Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. (9 George) 574 (1860); Adams v.
Moberg, 356 Mo. 1175, 205 S. W. 2d 553 (1947); Teske v. Dittberner, 70
Neb. 544, 98 N. W. 57 (1903); Loffus v. Maw, 3 Giff. 592, 66 Eng. Rep. 544(1862).
86. West v. Stainback, 108 Cal. App. 2d 806, 240 P. 2d 366 (2d Dist.
1952) ; Brickley v. Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149 Atl. 833 (1930) ; In re Soden's
Estate, 148 Atl. 12 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1929); 4 Page, Wills § 1736; Hirsch,
Contracts to Devise and Bequeath, Part II, 9 Wis. L. Rev. 388, 396 (1934).
87. Any thought that the making of the will is more than a mere inci-
dental feature to the transfer of title is refuted by a reference to the cases
where a constructive trust has been imposed even though the contract made
no provision for a will. Keefe v. Keefe, 19 Cal. App. 310, 125 Pac. 929 (1st
Dist. 1912) (referred to as a resulting trust although constructive trust would
have been a more accurate designation) ; Best v. Gralapp, 69 Neb. 811, 96
N. W. 641 (1903), aff'd on rehearing, 69 Neb. 815, 99 N. W. 837 (1904).
The argument has been unsuccessfully made that a contract to make a will
is fully performed by the execution of the will even though it is later revoked.
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equity seizes upon the constructive trust as a substitute vehicle to
accomplish the same result. It is just as accurate to apply the term
specific performance to a remedy of this type as it is to give that
designation to a transfer by court decree when a deed is con-
templated.
Where specific real estate is involved, the uniqueness of the land
may be seized upon as ground for equitable jurisdiction to enforce
specific performance in the same way in which that principle is
applied in contracts to convey.8s The same doctrine might well be
extended to include contracts for wills of real estate plus a sum of
money" o or real estate plus non-unique personal property 0 on the
theory that the contract must be dealt with as a whole and that since
equity is given jurisdiction because of the real estate involved it will
take jurisdiction for all purposes. But equity does not stop here.
Promises to leave an entire estate9' or a fractional part of an estate92
by will are often specifically enforced in equity without placing any
special significance upon the presence or absence of land or unique
chattels as part of the promisor's property. It then becomes neces-
If the execution of the will were the fundamental item the argument would
appear valid. Scham v. Besse, 397 Ill. 309, 74 N. E. 2d 517 (1947).
For a treatment of the distinction between constructive trusts and re-
suiting trusts, see 3 Scott, Trusts § 462.1 (1939).
88. The social and economic importance of land has long been con-
sidered such that the remedy at law for breach of a contract to convey is in-
adequate. The contract may be specifically enforced by either party to it.
3 American Law of Property § 11.68 (Casner ed. 1952) ; 5 Corbin, Contracts
§ 1143. Of course there is no occasion for the promisor's seeking specific
performance on the contract to devise; consequently, cases on the point are
not available.
89. Brickley v. Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149 Atl. 833 (1930) ; McCullough
v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929). The decree may quiet
title to the real estate in the promisee and direct the administrator to pay over
the money. A copy of the decree may then be certified to the probate court
with direction that it be accepted as an established claim. Lacey v. Zeigler,
98 Neb. 380, 152 N. W. 792 (1915).
90. Mickle v. Moore, 193 Ga. 150, 17 S. E. 2d 728 (1941).
91. Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 2 So. 624 (1886); Moumal v.
Walsh, 9 Alaska 656 (1940) ; Barr v. Ferris, 41 Cal. App. 2d 527, 107 P. 2d
269 (4th Dist. 1940); Matthews v. Blanos, 201 Ga. 549, 40 S. E. 2d 715(1946) ; Scham v. Besse, 397 Ill. 309, 74 N. E. 2d 517 (1947) ; West v. Sims,
153 Kan. 248, 109 P. 2d 479 (1941) ; Howe v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N. E.
415 (1901) ; Laird v. Vila, 93 Minn. 45, 100 N. W. 656 (1904) ; Sportsman v.
Halstead, 347 Mo. 286, 147 S. W. 2d 447 (1941) ; Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb.
591, 134 N. W. 185 (1912) ; Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S. C. 122, 117 S. E. 192(1922) ; Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wash. 2d 941, 182 P. 2d 49 (1947).
92. Fowler v. Hansen, 48 Cal. App. 2d 518, 120 P. 2d 161 (2d Dist.
1941); Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489 (1914); Savannah Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111, 11 S. E. 2d 766 (1940) ; Chehak v. Battles,
133 Iowa 107, 110 N. W. 330 (1907) ; Johnson v. Soden, 152 Kan. 284, 103 P.
2d 812 (1940) ; Jannetta v. Jannetta, 205 Minn. 266, 285 N. W. 619 (1939) ;
Roth v. Roth, 340 Mo. 1043, 104 S. W. 2d 314 (1937) ; Johnson v. Hubbell, 10
N. J. Eq. (2 Stockton) 332 (Ch. 1855) ; Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 454,
122 N. E. 696 (1919) ; Kelley v. Devin, 65 Ore. 211, 132 Pac. 535 (1913)
Carstairs v. Bomar, 119 Tex. 364, 29 S. W. 2d 334 (1930).
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sary to find something other than the uniqueness of the thing prom-
ised as a basis for jurisdiction to grant this unique remedy.
It is frequently stated that specific performance wil be decreed
where the promisee's performance is of such a nature as to make
its valuation in money difficult or impossible.9 3 In view of the fact
that contracts to devise or bequeath are often agreements for the
rendering of intimate personal services involving companionship,
society, or filial obligations the ease with which it may be said that
such services are incapable cf monetary valuation is readily ap-
parent. The fallacy of relying upon such a theory as a basis for
equitable jurisdiction is revealed when it is remembered that there
is no necessity for the court's determining the value of the services
in an ordinary action at law for damages where the aim is to
recover, not the value of the services rendered, but rather the value
of the promised performance. The value of the property to be devised
or bequeathed is the measure of damages0 4 and unless some other
obstacle is encountered the remedy at law is quife adequate.
A careful reading of the cases appearing to stand for the propo-
sition that difficulty or impossibility of determining a monetary
value of the promisee's performance is ground for specific enforce-
ment will reveal that most of them do not hold that at all. Such
declarations are usually found in connection with the equitable fraud
theory of relief against the application of the Statute of Frauds
where the position is taken that if the promisee's performance is
such that he cannot be compensated by a return to him of the con-
sideration paid the promisor will not be permitted to set up the
Statute of Frauds as a defense to an action on the contract. The
frequency with which contracts for the making of wills are informal
oral arrangements has resulted in an unusually large number of
93. Oles v. Wilson, supra note 92; Smith v. Nyburg, 136 Kan. 572, 16
P. 2d 493 (1932) ; Downing v. Maag, 215 Minn. 506, 10 N. W. 2d 778 (1943) ;
Simonson v. Moseley, 183 Minn. 525, 237 N. W. 413 (1931); Sutton v.
Hayden, 62 Mo. 101 (1876) ; Tiggrelbeck v. Russell, 187 Ore. 554, 213 P. 2d
156 (1949).
94. See cases cited in notes 42-44 supra.
95. White v. Smith, 43 Idaho 354, 253 Pac. 849 (1926) ; Svanburg v.
Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4 (1899) ; Teske v. Dittberner, 70 Neb. 544,
98 N. W. 57 (1903) ; Clark v. Atkins, 188 Va. 668, 51 S. E. 2nd 222 (1949) ;
2 Corbin, Contracts § 435 (1950) ; Pomeroy, Specific Performance § 114 (3d
ed. 1926).
In jurisdictions refusing to recognize the "equitable fraud" or "hardship"
theory of relief against the Statute of Frauds specific performance of the oral
contract to devise in return for services is denied. Hooks v. Bridgewater, 111
Tex. 122, 229 S. W. 1114 (1921). Courts refusing to recognize part perform-
ance of any kind as ground for taking an oral contract out of the operation of
the Statute of Frauds permit an action at law to recover the consideration
paid by the promisee and where that consideration consists of services
incapable of valuation the value of the thing promised is accepted as their
true value. Walker v. Dill's Adm'r, 186 Ky. 638, 218 S. W. 247 (1920).
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"equitable fraud" or "hardship" cases in this field. The nature of
the promisee's performance is often used as a basis for taking the
case out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds. It is then possible
to prove the oral contract but some other ground must be found for
equitable jurisdiction to enforce specific performance.
The fundamental basis for equitable jurisdiction, inadequacy of
the remedy at law, must be found here as well as elsewhere. In
cases of contracts to devise or bequeath all or a fractional part of an
estate that inadequacy rests, not in any uniqueness of the considera-
tion furnished by the promisee, and not in any unique qualities of
the thing promised, but rather in a uniqueness in the manner of
ascertaining the thing promised. The thing promised depends upon
the value of the estate. This necessarily means the net value.96 The
law court has no adequate means of ascertaining that value while
the administration is pending. 7 The proper forum for an accounting
of liabilities and a determination of the net amount of a decedent's
estate is the probate court. If action on the contract must be post-
poned until this is done and if the promisee is left to his remedy at
law, he is likely to find the property beyond his reach in the hands of
the decedent's legal successors and his action barred by non-claim
statutes. Adequate relief to the promisee depends upon the power
of equity to give specific relief to prevent unjust enrichment. In
doing this equity proceeds to act upon the title to the property. In
the usual proceeding the executor or administrator and the promi-
sor's successors, whether they be heirs and next of kin or bene-
ficiaries of an inconsistent will, are made parties defendant.98 A
96. Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489 (1914) ; In re Peterson,
76 Neb. 652, 107 N. W. 993 (1906), aff'd and explained on rehearing, 76 Neb.
661, 111 N. W. 361 (1907) ; Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N. W. 801(1934).
97. Action at law for a judgment based upon the net value of an- estate
should not be entertained in any event. The law court is not equipped t,)
handle estate accounting and a jury is not competent to determine the value
of an estate. Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29 AtI. 15 (1893) ; In re Peterson,
76 Neb. 652, 107 N. W. 993 (1906), aff'd and explained on rehearing, 76
Neb. 661, 111 N. W. 361 (1907). See also Trower v. Young, 40 Cal. App.
2d 539, 105 P. 2d 160 (4th Dist. 1940). Conceivably an action at law could be
maintained and a judgment rendered for the net value of the estate thereby
making a remedy at law possible. Relief of this kind has been eranted in
Wisconsin. Dilger v. McQuade's Estate, 158 Wis. 328, 148 N. W. 1085 (1914).
But equitable relief is clearly better adapted to the doing of complete justice
in such cases and the fact that there is a possible remedy at law should
not deprive equity of jurisdiction. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N. D. 346, 43
N. W. 2d 649 (1950).
98. Bolman v. Overall, 80 Ala. 451, 2 So. 624 (1886); Furman v.
Craine, 18 Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (2d Dist. 1912) ; Savannah Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111, 11 S. E. 2d 766 (1940) ; Downing v. Maag,
215 Minn. 506, 10 N. W. 2d 778 (1943); Adams v. Moberg, 376 'Mo. 1175,
205 S. W. 2d 553 (1947); Clark v. Atkins, 188 Va. 668, 51 S. E. 2d 222
(1949).
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constructive trust is then impressed upon the entire estate. Adminis-
tration proceeds in the usual way so far as payment of debts and
expenses is concerned, but the decree provides for transfer of the
entire estate or fractional part thereof as the case may be to the
promisee at the time for distribution.9
Although both the personal representative and the heirs or de-
visees are usually made parties to an action for specific performance
of a contract to make a will, a determination of who are the neces-
sary parties depends upon the nature of the property involved and
the type of the relief sought. If the estate consists entirely of per-
sonal property, the personal representative is the only necessary
party, 00 but if real estate is involved the heirs or devisees must
be named.' 0 ' Although both the personal representative and the
promisor's successors would appear to be proper parties in any
event, since the decree operates only upon title to the property in
the hands of the successors,' 0- it has been said that the personal
representative is not even a proper party unless there is a prayer
for some type of relief against him.' 03 The relief often sought in
such cases is that the executor or administrator be enjoined from
distributing the property to anyone other than the promisee. 4 Such
an injunction is sometimes desirable and may be obtained while a
final determination of the rights under the contract is still pend-
99. The manner used to get legal title to the promisee is of no particular
significance. In many instances the promisee is adjudged the true owner
and the decree itself serves to transfer title. Cox v. Hutto, 216 Ala. 232, 113
So. 40 (1927) ; Bray v. Cooper, 145 Kan. 642, 66 P. 2d 592 (1937) ; Adams v.
Moberg, supra note 98; Baylor v. Bath, 189 S. C. 269, 1 S. E. 2d 139 (1938).
The heirs or devisees are sometimes directed to convey to the promisee.
Decrees to this effect usually carry the added provision that if the heir or
devisee fails to convey, the clerk of the court or a commissioner will execute
the formality for him. Furman v. Craine, 18 Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007(2d Dist. 1912) ; Anson v. Haywood, 397 Ili. 370, 74 N. E. 2d 489 (1947) ;
Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S. C. 122, 117 S. E. 192 (1922) ; Goilmere v. Battison,
1 Vern. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682). The executor may be directed to convey
the land and deliver the personalty to the promisee. Scham v. Besse, 397 Ill.
309, 74 N. E. 2d 517 (1947) ; In re Stevens' Will, 192 Misc. 179, 78 N. Y. S.
2d 868 (Surr. Ct. 1948) ; Brock v. Noecker, 66 N. D. 567, 267 N. W. 656
(1936). If the prayer is for the property or its value it is within the discretion
of the court to direct that the property be turned over to the promisee or that
it be sold and he be given the proceeds. Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253
N. W. 801 (1934).
100. Rubalcava v. Garst, 56 N. M. 647, 248 P. 2d 207 (1952).
101. Furman v. Craine, 18 Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (2d Dist 1912);
Rubalcava v. Garst, 56 N. M. 647, 248 P. 2d 207 (1952).
102. "The district court judgment has nothing to do with the devolu-
tion of title by testation or descent That devolution is adjudged by the
probate court Then, and not until then, the district court judgment operates
on the title, as by the decree of distribution it is confirmed in the distributees."
Jannetta v. Jannetta, 205 Minn. 266, 271, 285 N. W. 619, 622 (1939).
103. Furman v. Craine, 18 Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (2d Dist. 1912).
104. Ibid.; Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4 (1899);
Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 454, 122 N. E. 696 (1919).
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ing. 05 Since the claim made in any event is ultimately a claim by
the promisee against the promisor's legal successors, if the contract
is enforced court costs should be borne by the heir or devisee, not
the estate.100
The action for specific performance is not a claim against the
estate. It is a claim of title to the estate.'0 7 The decision that the
executor is the only necessary party defendant to a binding decree
as to the personalty 0 8 rests, not upon the executor's power to de-
fend claims against the estate, but upon the executor's title to the
personal property in the estate. The right of the promisee to recover
is not affected by his failure to make objection to distribution and
settlement of the estate, °0 his own petition for issuance of letters,110
or even the filing of his own claim against the estate."' It is a
claim of property which is completely independent of probate and
may be brought after the probate decree has become final." 2
Emphasis upon the distinction between a claim of title to prop-
erty and a claim against the estate has led to the granting of specific
performance of contracts to bequeath a definite sum of money in a
few instances." 3 It is submitted that this is an erroneous applica-
tion of the claim-of-title principle. It is a principle to be used as an
explanation of equitable relief when no adequate remedy at law
exists and not as a basis for equitable jurisdiction even where
adequate relief could be had in an action for damages. If the
promisee's only claim is for a specific sum of money his remedy at
105. Jannetta v. Jannetta, 205 Minn. 266, 285 N. W. 619 (1939).
106. Turner v. Theiss, 129 W. Va. 23, 38 S. E. 2d 369 (1946).
107. Moumal v. Walsh, 9 Alaska 656 (1940) ; Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark.
494, 152 S. W. 155 (1912) ; Trower v. Young, 40 Cal. App. 2d 539, 105 P. 2d
160 (4th Dist. 1940) ; Ashbauth v. Davis, 71 Idaho 150, 227 P. 2d 954 (1951);
Brickley v. Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149 Atl. 833 (1930) ; Svanburg v. Fosseen,
75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4 (1899) ; Erwin v. Mark, 105 Mont. 361, 73 P. 2d
537 (1937) ; McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929).
In many instances the promisee has the choice of claiming title to the
estate through an action for specific performance or of pursuing his claim
against the estate through other means. The application of the non-claim
statutes might vary depending upon the remedy sought. See text at notes
222-229 infra.
108. Rubalcava v. Garst, 56 N. M. 647, 248 P. 2d 207 (1952).
109. Mosloski v. Gamble, 191 Minn. 170, 253 N. W. 378 (1934) ; Phalen
v. U. S. Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906).
110. Mosloski v. Gamble, supra note 109; Thrall v. Thrall, 60 Wis. 503,
19 N. W. 353 (1884).
111. Ibid.
112. White v. Smith, 43 Idaho 354, 253 Pac. 849 (1926).
113. Wilkins v. Anderson, 172 Md. 700, 191 Atl. 433 (1937) ; Erwin v.
Mark, 105 Mont. 361, 73 P. 2d 537 (1937) (emphasizing the promisee's posi-
tion as being that of a legatee). See Sheffield v. Baker, 201 Ark. 527, 145 S. W.
2d 347 (1940) (contract not sufficiently proved but an indication that equity
would have granted relief if it had been).
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law through an action against the personal representative is com-
plete and readily available. 114
Of course the fact that the thing promised is a definite sum of
money will not prevent jurisdiction in equity if there are special
circumstances making the remedy at law inadequate and the prom-
isee is still in good conscience entitled to relief. In Ohlendiek v.
Schuler 1" 5 the promisee was an enemy alien at the time of the
promisor's death and as such was barred from bringing action in
the American courts. But two years later his status as an enemy
alien was removed, but by this time action at law was barred by
the statute of limitations. Equity nevertheless entertained an action
for specific performance.1 6 Where the promisor conveys most of
his property to volunteers prior to his death so that an action against
the personal representative would be ineffective the grantees may
be declared constructive trustees and an equitable lien imposed to
the extent of the promisee's c[aim.11 7
Equity will intervene to recover the property from third per-
sons when the promisor makes inter vivos transfers in bad faith
and in contravention of the contract. An inter vivos conveyance of
specific real estate to one having knowledge that it is the subject
matter of a contract to devise is ineffective against the promisee and
will be set aside upon his petition after the death of the promisor.1" 8
The same rule will apply to a transfer of a particular tract of land
made in bad faith to a mere volunteer even though the contract is
in general terms for an entire estate." 9 If the contract includes par-
114. Newell v. Capelle, 14 F. Supp. 147 (D. Del. 1936), aff'd 86 F. 2d
1007 (3d Cir. 1936) ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 193 Pac. 84 (1920) ;
Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 Pac. 259 (1915); Welsh v. Hour, 100
N. J. Eq. 417, 136 Atl. 327 (Ch. 1927).
115. 299 Fed. 182 (6th Cir. 1924).
116. Of course in the absence of such extenuating circumstances the fact
that an action is barred by the statute of limitations is not the kind of in-
adequacy of legal remedy as will give equity jurisdiction. Shive v. Barrow,
88 Cal. App. 2d 838, 199 P. 2d 693 (2d Dist. 1948).
117. West v. Stainback, 108 Cal. App. 2d 806, 240 P. 2d 366 (2d Dist.
1952).
118. Krcmar v. Krcmar, 202 Iowa 1166, 211 N. W. 699 (1927) ; Parsell
v. Stryker, 41 N. Y. 480 (1869). Where the conveyance is to a bona fide pur-
chaser if the proceeds can be traced into the estate a constructive trust will
be impressed there. Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 Pac. 878 (1912). Where
the status of bona fide purchaser is raised actual notice of the contract is
usually found. It would seem that constructive notice could be given by
recording in the same way contra:ts to convey are recorded. Sec Krcmar v.
Krcmar supra.
119. Johnson v. Soden, 152 Kan. 284, 103 P. 2d 812 (1940) ; Hickman v.
Harrell, 211 S. W. 2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis.
162, 225 N. W. 831 (1929). The fact that grantees of grantees of the promisor
are involved makes no difference so long as all are mere volunteers. Osw~ald
v. Nehls, 233 Ill. 438, 84 N. E. 619 (1908).
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ticular real estate and identified non-unique chattels and both are
transferred to a volunteer and the promisor's estate remains solvent,
the promisee may obtain a decree vesting title to the realty in him-
self and awarding damages against the executor in the amount of
the value of the personalty. 120 If the estate is insolvent and the
property can be traced, a constructive trust should be impressed
upon both realty and personalty in the hands of transferees.12 .
Even where the property cannot be traced a decree has been
awarded that the transferees pay over a sum of money equal to its
value.1 22 While it is clear that the promisee is entitled to follow
the property into the hands of volunteers so long as it can be
traced, recovery of damages would seem to involve converting inno-
cent donees into wrongdoers and should probably be denied.
Further difficulties might arise where there is a contract for
the devise of specific real estate and the promisor sells the subject
matter of the contract to a bona fide purchaser. It has been held
that if the proceeds of the sale are used to buy other land a remedy
in the nature of specific performance is available to compel a con-
veyance of the substituted land to the promisee. 23
The general rules restricting or limiting the relief available
wherever specific performance is sought are not altered or varied
by the fact that a promise to make a will is involved. The require-
ment that the contract be fair and reasonable demands that the
consideration be not grossly disproportionate.124 Contracts to devise
or bequeath usually involve agreements for some type of support,
care, or maintenance of the promisor. If the care is to continue
only so long as the promisor's funds last and the promisee is to
receive the promisor's entire estate in case of his demise before
that time, the contract will not be specifically enforced even though
the promisee fully performs.1 25 However, if the promisee binds him-
self to care for the promisor for his entire life the fact that the
promisor dies when only a small amount of care has been rendered
will not affect the promisee's right to receive the entire estate.126
An important factor which runs throughout these contracts is that
they are usually arrangements among relatives or very close friends,
120. Ragsdale v. Achuff, 324 Mo. 1159, 27 S. W. 2d 6 (1930).
121. Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N. Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
122. Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S. W. 188 (1926).
123. Colby v. Street, 146 Minn. 290, 178 N. W. 599 (1920).
124. Sportsman v. Halstead, 347 Mo. 286, 147 S. W. 2d 447 (1941);
In re Byrne's Estate, 122 Pa. Super. 413, 186 Atl. 187 (1936).
125. Imthurn v. Martin, 150 Kan. 906, 96 P. 2d 860 (1939).
126. Matthews v. Blanos, 201 Ga. 549, 40 S. E. 2d 715 (1946).
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and a contract which might appear unfair or unconscionable be-
tween strangers might be entirely reasonable between near rela-
tives.1 27 It is also quite possible that a contract which seems alto-
gether proper when made might be rendered unconscionable by
subsequent events. In Flowers v. Roberts'28 a contract requiring
the promisee and his family to move into the home of an aged rela-
tive and care for her was involved. Extremely strained relations
later developed between the parties and ejectment was brought
against the promisee who claimed title and a right to specific en-
forcement of his contract. The court denied relief to the promisee
but indicated that if harmony was later restored and performance
by him became practicable a remedy might be granted. Some courts
hold that a contract by which an unmarried person agrees to leave
his entire estate by will is by its nature unfair to a subsequent spouse
and will not be specifically enforced against such spouse.1 29 Wher-
ever specific relief is denied because of the unfairness or unreason-
ableness of the contract the promisee may recover at law in quantum
meruit.
The enforcement of specific performance is sometimes prevented
by the promisee's failure to completely fulfill his own obligations.1 0
The promisee or third party beneficiary may also lose his right to
any relief whatever by conducting himself in a manner inconsistent
with the contract.' 8'
A rule often pronounced is that in order to sustain a decree for
specific performance the contract must show a higher degree of
certainty than is required to sustain an action at law.13 8 There is
little indication from the cases that the rule is of any force except
to the extent to which it may be said that more evidence is required
to prove an enforceable contract either in law or equity than is
required to rebut a presumption that services were performed
127. Parsell v. Stryker, 41 I. Y. 480 (1869).
128. 220 S. C. 110, 66 S. E. 2d 612 (1951).
129. Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444,45 Pac. 710 (1896).
130. Sopcich v. Tangeman, 153 Neb. 506, 45 N. W. 2d 478 (1951).
Specific performance has been denied even where full performance by the
promisee was prevented by the promisor. Roy v. Pos, 183 Cal. 359, 191 Pac.
542 (1920). But if the promisee has substantially performed and has held
himself in readiness to complete the performance an omission which was
made with the consent of the promisor should not hinder an action for specific
enforcement of the contract. Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wash. 2d 941, 182 P. 2d 49
(1947). If the promisee's default consists of a failure to compensate the
promisor for certain items for which he was obligated specific performance
may be decreed upon condition that payments are made. Kelley v. Dodge, 334
Mich. 499, 54 N. W. 2d 730 (1952).
131. Wolf v. Rich, 154 Kan. 636, 121 P. 2d 270 (1942).
132. Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 278, 30 P. 2d 853, 854 (1934) ; Ander-
son v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 124, 227 P. 2d 351, 358 (1951).
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gratuitously. 133 An agreement to reward a family for care and main-
tenance rendered the promisor434 or to give the promisee as much
as any relation of the promisor"31 would each appear to be too un-
certain by any standard to be specifically enforced. But courts fre-
quently declare that a contract to make a will may be specifically
enforced if its terms are reasonably certain. 36 In Lawrence v.
Prosser"7 there was a contract to "provide amply" for the promisee.
Subsequently a will was made which appeared to carry out the
contract. A later will revoked the first and left only a small legacy
to the promisee. It was held that whatever certainty the contract
lacked was supplied by the first will. In Morgan v. Sanborn"8s a
husband and wife contracted with each other that the survivor of
them would distribute their entire property among the next of kin
of each of them according to his or her discretion. The wife was
the survivor and it was her discretion to distribute the entire amount
to her own next of kin. The next of kin of the husband obtained a
decree of specific performance giving them one-half the property.
Lack of mutuality of remedy is occasionally given potency as a
defense to an action for specific performance to devise in return for
services rendered.130 However, it is ordinarily recognized, here as
well as elsewhere in contract law, that since the promisee has al-
ready fully performed the services the fact that he could not have
been compelled to perform them will not prevent him from obtaining
specific relief. 40
Direct actions for specific performance or the establishment of
constructive trusts are not the only channels through which equity
may move to secure the promisee's right to the property. Reference
has already been made to counterclaims for specific performance in
ejectment actions where equitable defenses to actions at law are
permitted.' 41 The promisee's rights may also be litigated in an
action brought against him by the promisor's successors to quiet
133. Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal. 2d 334, 84 P. 2d 146 (1938).
134. Shakespeare v. Markham, 72 N. Y. 400 (1878).
135. Graham v. Graham's Ex'rs, 34 Pa. 475 (1859).
136. Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wash. 2d 941, 949-951, 182 P. 2d 49, 53-54
(1947).
137. 88 N. J. Eq. 43, 101 Atl. 1040 (Ch. 1917).
138. 225 N. Y. 454, 122 N. E. 696 (1919).
139. Martin v. Martin, 230 S. W. 2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
140. Bolander v. Godsil, 116 F. 2d 437 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Ashbauth v.
Davis, 71 Idaho 150, 227 P. 2d 954 (1951) ; Oswald v. Nehls, 233 Ill. 438, 84
N. E. 619 (1908) ; Bray v. Cooper, 145 Kan. 642, 66 P. 2d 592 (1937) ; Howe
v. Watson, 179 Mass. 30, 60 N. E. 415 (1901) ; Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101
(1876) ; Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S. E. 992 (1900) ; 5 Corbin,
Contracts §§ 1180, 1189.
141. See text at notes 83-84 supra.
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their title.14 2 Some courts have permitted the promisee to bring his
own action to quiet title. 143 While there is no substantive difference
between the result reached in this type of action and an action to
impress a constructive trust, the suit to quiet title in the promisee
raises theoretical questions of no small consequence. In the strict
sense there is no basis for an action to quiet title since the promisee
does not have any legal title.'" Therefore, it becomes necessary for
the decree quieting the title to also serve as a transfer of title. A
prayer that the title be quieted is sometimes made a part of a peti-
tion to impress a constructive trust 45 or to set aside an inter vivos
conveyance by the promisor. 4 6
Where an action is brought for specific enforcement but that
relief is denied because of the Statute of Frauds1 47 or because of a
partial default by the promisee .4 8 equity will retain jurisdiction to
award compensation for the performance rendered. The measure
of the award in such cases is the value of the promisee's perform-
ance, not the value of the thing promised. 4 9 An equitable lien for
the amount of the award should be established against the prop-
erty promised. 50
If the promisee is one of a number of heirs or devisees of the
promisor his right to the property may be determined in an action
142. Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N. W. 330 (1907).
143. Mountz v. Brown, 119 Ind. App. 38, 81 N. E. 2d 374 (1948);
Krcmar v. Krcmar, 202 Iowa 11(6, 211 N. W. 699 (1927) ; Best v. Gralapp,
69 Neb. 811, 96 N. W. 641 (1903:), affd on rehearing, 69 Neb. 815, 99 N. W.
837 (1904). The suit to quiet titl5 may be maintained against a grantee who
received a conveyance from the promisor without consideration. McCullom v.
Mackrell, 13 S. D. 262, 83 N. W. 255 (1900).
144. See Kelley v. Devin, 65 Ore. 211, 216, 132 Pac. 535, 536 (1913).
145. Trower v. Young, 40 Cal. App. 2d 539, 105 P. 2d 160 (4th Dist.
1940).
146. Mau v. McManaman, 29 Cal. App. 2d 631, 85 P. 2d 209 (3d Dist.
1938).
147. Thomas v. Feese, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 206, 51 S. W. 150 (1899);
Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933) ; In re Byrne's
Estate, 122 Pa. Super. 413, 186 At. 187 (1936).
148. Hodgson v. Martin, 9) Ore. 105, 166 Pac. 929 (1917), modified
and aff'd, 90 Ore. 108, 175 Pac. 671 (1918).
149. Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933).
150. Worthwhile authority on the establishment of the lien has not
been found. Such a lien was established in Thomas v. Feese, 21 Ky. L. Rep.
206, 51 S. W. 150 (1899). That case involved a contract to leave an entire
estate as compensation for services. The estate at the time of the contract and
at the time of the promisor's death consisted principally of two small tracts
of real estate. The court seemed to treat the contract in the first instance as
one to compensate for services hence ground for not applying the Statute
of Frauds and secondly as one to devise particular real estate therefore
ground for establishing the lien.
Where there is a contract for an entire estate and the promisor repudiates
before the promisee has completed his performance the promisee will not be
entitled to a lien in an action for damages while the promisor is still alive.
Johnston v. Myers, 138 Iowa 497, 116 N. W. 600 (1908).
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brought against him for partition of the premises.151 Occasionally
the promisor leaves a will in conformity with the contract but
wrongfully or in bad faith conveys the property to others prior to
his death. If the transferees are not bona fide purchasers the con-
veyance will be set aside and the property permitted to pass under
the will.15 2 Even a conveyance of real estate which took place prior
to the formation of the contract may be cancelled in this manner
if the deed was not recorded and the promisee rendered a full per-
formance without notice of its existence.
5 3
A remedy which does not seem to have been used but which
might be practicable in some instances is a bill of interpleader
brought by the executor or administrator. By this procedure the
rival claimants could be brought before the court and their respec-
tive rights determined before distribution is made. 5 '
Contracts to devise or bequeath are by their nature arrange-
ments for the final winding up of the affairs of the promisors. Such
a final winding up is likely to include a plan for disposition of a
home, a business involving real property, an entire 'estate, or a
fractional part of an estate. Agreements of this kind are without
adequate remedies at law. Particular circumstances might arise
which would render inadequate the legal remedy for a breach of
contract to bequeath a sum of money or a non-unique chattel, but
unless such peculiar circumstances are actually present there is no
justification for equitable intervention in these cases.
Priority and Abatement
Very little direct authority is available on the position of the
promisee of a contract to make a will with respect to the claims of
creditors and legatees. Statements can be found in the cases that
the promisee's claim is not a claim against the estate but a claim of
property which is itself subject to claims against the estate ;155 that
151. Naylor v. Shelton, 102 Ark. 30, 143 S. W. 117 (1912) ; Van Tine
v. Van Tine, 15 AtI. 249 (N.J. Eq. 1888).
152. Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N. W. 831 (1929).
153. Larkins v. Howard, 252 Ala. 9, 39 So. 2d 224 (1949).
154. In Day v. Washburn, 76 N. H. 203, 81 Atl. 474 (1911) the promisee
of a contract to devise or bequeath an entire estate brought action for specific
performance naming both the administrator and the legatees of an incon-
sistent will as defendants. In sustaining equitable jurisdiction to grant the
relief prayed for the court treated the action as if it were a bill of inter-
pleader by which the administrator had brought the opposing parties before
the court. The administrator was then directed to distribute the estate to
the promisee leaving no property upon which the will could operate.
If the promisee is also the administrator he may establish his title to
the property in a bill against the heirs for settlement of the estate. Rose v.
Reese, 290 Ky. 356, 160 S. W. 2d 614 (1941).
155. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N. D. 346, 353, 43 N. W. 2d 649, 654
(1950).
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it is not part of the estate and not subject to claims against the
estate ;156 that it is a legacy which must abate with other legacies ;17
that it ranks with other creditors ;158 and many other apparently
conflicting declarations. These expressions are usually unaccom-
panied by any analysis of the nature of the promise being enforced
and are most often found in cases where there is not such insuffi-
ciency of assets as to necessitate any actual decision on priorities.
Whatever rights the promisee might have are rights arising out
of contract and the nature of the contract must be taken into ac-
count in any consideration of priorities. If the contract is for speci-
fic real estate or unique chattels the promisee acquires an equitable
right to the property concerned when the contract is entered into.
This equitable right is on the same footing as the right acquired by
a contracting vendee in similar circumstances and should not be
defeated by anyone other than a bona fide purchaser."" If the
promisee has fully performed when the promisor dies the equitable
right to ownership and possession passes to him immediately and
cannot be subjected to claims against the estate.100 It is a right of
ownership which may be asserted after the time permitted for the
filing of claims by creditors has passed.161
In Legro v. Kelley'62 the promisee of a contract to bequeath
certain unique personalty was in possession of the property when
the promisor died. .The executrix brought action for possession.
Although there were unpaid creditors and no other property in the
estate the court held that the promisee was entitled to the property
and that it did not even have to go through the process of ad-
ministration.
The promisee of a contract to will all or a fractional part of the
promisor's estate also has an equitable right capable of being speci-
fically enforced. It too is a right to title, not a claim against the
156. "On the contrary, the right to recover is based upon the fact
that the property claimed does not belong to the estate, but belongs to the
person asserting title ... " Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 499, 152 S. W.
155, 157 (1912).
157. Sard v. Sard, 147 Me. 46, 51, 83 A. 2d 286, 290 (1951) ; Erwin v.
Mark, 105 Mont 361, 373-374, 73 P. 2d 537, 540-541 (1937).
158. Searcy v. Clark, 190 Ark. 1069, 1072, 82 S. W. 2d 839 840 (1935).
159. Legro v. Kelley, 311 Mass. 674, 42 N. E. 2d 836 (19425.
160. An appropriate form cf a decree for specific performance would
be one vesting title in the promisee "free and clear of any and all claims or
debts of the estate of" the promisor. Adams v. Moberg, 356 Mo. 1175, 1185,
205 S. W. 2d 553, 558 (1947).
161. Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark 494, 152 S. W. 155 (1912) ; Brickley v.
Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149 .Atl. 833 (1930); New England Trust Co. v.
Spaulding, 310 Mass. 424, 38 N. E. 2d 672 (1941) (option to buy unique per-
sonal property); McCullough v. McCullough, 153 Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70(1929).
162. 311 Mass. 674, 42 N. E. 2d 836 (1942).
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estate.' 3 It differs materially from the rights under a contract to
devise a specific thing in that it does not purport to give the
promisee any right to any particular property either at the time of
the formation of the contract or at the death of the promisor. By
the terms of the contract the promisee is entitled to what is left at
the promisor's death. Inter vivos obligations of the promisor must
be met before there is anything left for the promisee.16 4 The prom-
isee did not contract for and is not entitled to the status of a
creditor.163 The contract creates rather than removes the need for
an administration. 168
It is concerning this type of contract that it is accurate to say
that the right acquired by the promisee is a property right in the
estate which is itself subject to claims against the estate.167 To this
it must be added that claims of legatees and devisees are not claims
against the estate. These are claims of property which are subordi-
nate to the right of the promisee. The satisfaction of the contract
takes the property out of the estate as soon as all administration
expenses and inter vivos obligations are paid leaving nothing upon
which an inconsistent will can operate.168
A contract for a bequest of a specific sum of money or a non-
unique chattel is materially different from either of the two types
of contracts referred to above and raises different problems in
priority and abatement. The promisee acquires a right to receive
property or money at the promisor's death, but there is not involved
any uniqueness which can give the promisee an equitable right to
any particular item of property. In the event of a breach he can
163. Moumal v. Walsh, 9 Alaska 656 (1940); Furman v. Craine, 18
Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (2d Dist. 1912) ; Ashbauth v. Davis, 71 Idaho
150, 227 P. 2d 954 (1951) ; Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W.
4 (1899) ; O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N. D. 346, 43 N. W. 2d 649 (1950).
164. See Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134 N. W. 185 (1912) ; Estate
of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N. W. 801 (1934).
165. Ashbauth v. Davis, 71 Idaho 150, 227 P. 2d 954 (1951).
Where the consideration for an agreement to leave an entire estate was
services to be rendered by the promisee, in awarding damages for the value
of the services the Kentucky Court of Appeals seems to have given the
promisee priority over a judgment creditor of the estate. The basis for
the decision is too uncertain to constitute reliable authority but it appears
that the court conceived of the contract as one to devise particular real
estate in which the priority was given. Thomas v. Feese, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 206,
51 S. W. 150 (1899).
166. Wallace v. Hill, 207 Okla. 319, 249 P. 2d 452 (1952).
167. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N. D. 346, 43 N. W. 2d 649 (1950).
168. It re Peterson, 76 Neb. 652, 107 N. W. 993 (1906), aff'd and ex-
plained on rehearing, 76 Neb. 661, 111 N. W. 361 (1907) ; Day v. Washburn,
76 N. H. 203, 81 Atl. 474 (1911) ; Estate of Soles, 215 Wis. 129, 253 N. W.
801 (1934). If the contract is for a fractional part of the estate that fractional
part is calculated after all debts and administration costs are paid. Lang v.
Chase, 130 Me. 267, 155 Atl. 273 (1931).
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be fully compensated in money. This lack of a right to any specific
property would appear to negate any attempt to claim a priority
over other bona fide obligees of the promisor. At the same time the
contract is for a definite value. It is not a contract for what is left
when all other obligations are provided for. There is no reason why
a contract to pay $100 at death should have any higher or lower
priority than a contract to pay $100 on demand or at a fixed date
which is still future.
It has been said that a contract to bequeath a specific sum of
money or other non-unique personal property is merely a contract
that the promisee will be a legatee to that extent in the promisor's
will. 6 9 If he is only a legatee, not only are his rights subordinate
to all creditors, but his claim must abate with other legacies in the
event there are insufficient assets to pay them all in full. Such a
position is unsound. It has been taken in cases where no insuffi-
ciency of assets was indicated and no actual decision on the matter
called for. Should the dicta announced be applied the effectiveness
of such contracts would be destroyed. The promisor could always
provide for legacies so large that the rules of abatement would vir-
tually eradicate the rights of Ihe promisee.
Recognition that the promisee has a contractual right which is
not illusory but does not have a claim to any specific property de-
mands that he be treated as an unsecured creditor of the estate. If
assets are insufficient to pay all creditors of that class the rights of
the promisee must abate ratably with others, but he as well as other
creditors must be fully paid before there is anything left for
legatees.170
The clarity of the promisee's position as well as the ease with
which priority and abatement problems are resolved varies directly
with the emphasis the court places upon the nature of the particular
contract before them. Efforts to classify the promisee as a legatee
or a creditor are misleading rather than helpful. He should be rec-
ognized as a promisee of a ccntract to make a will. The key to his
169. See Sard v. Sard, 147 Me. 46, 51, 83 A. 2d 286, 290 (1951) ; Erwin
v. Mark, 105 Mont. 361, 373-374, 73 P. 2d 537, 540-541 (1937) ; In re Hoyt's
Estate, 174 Misc. 512, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 1940) (involving a dis-
tributive share of the surviving spouse).
170. Clear authority on this point is strangely lacking. For a case in-
volving a promissory note payable at death see Searcy v. Clark, 190 Ark.
1069, 82 S. W. 2d 839 (1935). But see Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 28
N. E. 578 (1891), where a promise to pay six months after death was in-
volved. No priority or abatement problem was before the court but it
was indicated that if such a question had been raised the claim of the
promisee would be subordinate t all other debts but prior to legacies. It
should be noted that the fact that the promise was under seal but without
consideration might account for this peculiar suggestion as to priority.
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position with reference to legatees, creditors, or other claimants of
the property left by the promisor is to be found in the terms of the
contract. In some instances this position is comparable to that of
a creditor, in others it is comparable to that of a legatee, and in
still others it is unlike either creditor or legatee.
Effect of Contract Upon Dower, Curtesy, or Other
Right of Surviving Spouse
There is considerable conflict of authority concerning the rights
of surviving spouses of promisors of contracts to make wills. Not
only is there the usual confusion resulting from every effort to
unite the contractual with the testamentary concept, but the tend-
ency of the courts to extend preferential treatment to the rights of
spouses supplies an additional complicating factor. The usual prob-
lem concerning marital rights in this area is that of the promisor
who, prior to the time of his marriage, contracts to make a will in
favor of some third person. Such a contract is an existing obliga-
tion at the time the marriage is entered into. It is a liability which
has the effect of removing property from the estate and would
appear to be no less a liability after the marriage than it was before
whether the spouse knew of its existence or not.
If a contract to devise a specific tract of real estate creates in
the promisee an unconditional right to receive that real estate upon
the death of the promisor it would appear certain that a marriage
of the promisor after entering into such a contract could not
operate to give his wife any dower rights in the property con-
cerned171 It would appear equally certain that if the right created
in the promisee represents an obligation against the estate of the
promisor the property should not be included as part of the prom-
isor's estate for the purpose of calculating the surviving spouse's
distributive share.1 7 2 A literal interpretation of the contract would
seem to call for these same results as to both dower and distributive
share where the contract is for the entire estate, and such has been
the result in a number of cases. 17 3 Whether dower or statutory share
171. Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 515, 36 S. E. 992 (1900) (em-
phasizing the analogy to the contract to sell).
172. See Price v. Craig, 164 Miss. 42, 143 So. 694 (1932). (This case
cannot be taken as clear authority for the proposition stated since it was a
contract for specific real estate and all other property the promisor might
own. The court emphasized that the promisee acquired a vested property right
by entering into the contract and that the promisor had a bare legal title at
the time of the marriage).
173. Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910) (treating the
promisor as holding the property as trustee at the time of the marriage) ;
In re Davis' Estate, 171 Kan. 605, 237 P. 2d 396 (1951) (holding that the
wife's lack of knowledge of the husband's contract at the time of marriage
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is involved the contract removes from the distributable estate the
property covered by it. Under this doctrine if the contract is for a
specific item of property any right which might arise in a future
spouse with reference to that property is necessarily subject to
the contractual obligation. Application of the same principle to a
contract for all property owned by the promisor at his death pre-
vents a subsequent spouse from ever acquiring any marital right
of any kind which would not be subordinate to the claim of the
promisee.
Logical as the conclusions stated above may appear judicial dis-
pleasure with their harshness toward surviving spouses has resulted
in a considerable degree of modification. At the time of his marriage
a husband was under a contractual obligation to leave a legacy of a
certain amount to a prior wife in In re Hoyt's Estate.74 The hus-
band later died leaving a will in conformity with the contract. It
was held that this contractual legacy was included in the husband's
estate for the purpose of calculating the distributive share of his
surviving widow and was subject to the widow's claim. In re
Tanenbaum's Estate'7 5 was cited as authority but the court failed to
take cognizance of the fact that in the Tanenbaum case an entirely
different question was presented. Both cases involved separation
agreements in which the respective husbands had agreed to pro-
vide for their wives through their wills. In the Tanenbaur case
the parties were never divorced. Upon the death of the husband the
wife claimed both her contractual legacy and her distributive share.
The theory adopted by the court was that the contractual legacy
was nevertheless a "legacy" which put the widow to an electionY.1 0
In the Hoyt case the court seized upon this classification of the
contractual legacy as a "legazy" and concluded that it was neces-
sarily part of the distributable estate. The soundness of this decision
makes no difference); Lewis v. :Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919)(indicating that a different result might be reached if a fraud was intended) ;
Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 Pac. 878 (1912) (suggesting that the wife
might be given dower if the circumstances are such that it would otherwise be
inequitable) ; Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc. 539, 280 N. Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct.
1935) (rights of promisee not affected by a statute providing that marriage
revokes a will previously executed).
174. 174 Misc. 512,21 N. Y. S. 2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
175. 258 App. Div. 285, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 507 (1939), motion for leave
to appeal denied, 258 App. Div. 1054, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 1021, vrotion for leave
to appeal denied, 282 N. Y. 810, 25 N. E. 2d 881 (1940).
176. The case could have been more properly disposed of as nothing
more than an action to enforce an ordinary contract to which both husband
and wife were parties. A contract between a husband and wife for the disposi-
tion of their respective properties precludes the survivor from claiming
against the will of the spouse who dies first carrying the agreement into
effect. Luthy v. Seaburn, 242 Iowa 184, 46 N. W. 2d 44 (1951) ; Seat v. Seat,
172 Tenn. (8 Beeler) 618, 113 S. W. 2d 751 (1938).
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is very questionable. The analysis adopted is at least an invi-
tation to future litigation when the same question arises where the
promisor has failed to provide for the agreed legacy and the prom-
isee seeks to enforce the contract. In such a case it is more demon-
trable that the promisee of a contract has rights entirely different
from those of a legatee and that it is improper to place the two on
the same footing.
Where contracts to devise or bequeath all the property owned
by the promisor have been enforced in a manner to deprive a sub-
sequent spouse of any property right in the decedent's estate, there
has often been the suggestion that enforcement might be denied
if the contract is entered into for the purpose of defrauding the
future spouse177 or if the circumstances are such that enforcement
would be highly inequitable.' 7 s If the contract is entered into with
an actual intent to defraud the future spouse, it can be set aside in
the same manner as can a conveyance made on the eve of marriage
with a similar intent."" There is also an established principle by
which equity may deny the remedy of specific performance when
to grant it would be inequitable or unjust to innocent third per-
sons."18 A surviving spouse who had no knowledge of the contract
at the time of marriage would seem to qualify as an innocent third
person who might suffer unjustly from enforcement of the contract.
The problem encountered here is that of determining what circum-
stances are to be regarded as sufficient to justify equity in denying
enforcement on this ground.
Emphasis is sometimes placed upon the economic position of
the surviving spouse and the duration of the marriage as possible
determining factors.181 However, in Owens v. McNally,'8 2 probably
the leading case on this point, no reference was made to either the
length of the marriage relationship or the economic position of the
parties."' The theory of the case seemed to be that the sanctity
of the marital rights is sufficient that in every case it is against
177. See Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 273, 178 Pac. 421, 422 (1919).
178. See Dillon v. Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 135-136, 123 Pac. 878, 880 (1912)(citing with approval cases from other jurisdictions where enforcement had
been refused on the ground that it would constitute a hardship upon the
surviving spouse).
179. 1 American Law of Property § 5.32 (Casner ed. 1952).
180. 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1169.
181. See Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N. W. 52 (1909).
182. 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896).
183. Although the opinion in Owens v. McNally failed to indicate either
the duration of the marriage or the economic status of the surviving wife
it was pointed out in a subsequent case that the promisor in the Owens case
died only eight months after the marriage took place. Sargent v. Corey, 34
Cal. App. 193, 196, 166 Pac. 1021, 1023 (1st Dist. 1917).
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public policy to permit those rights to be impaired by the specific
enforcement of pre-nuptial contracts with third persons when the
necessary effect of such enforcement is the complete consumption
of a decedent's estate. Such a policy is particularly applicable to
contracts to leave entire estates by will where the literal enforce-
ment of the contract would result in the promisor's disabling him-
self from ever conferring a marital property right upon a future
spouse.' 14
Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, s'' a well-reasoned Kentucky case, ac-
cepted the principle of Owevs v. McNally but also relied upon a
construction of the contract as a further ground for the decision.
A statutory dower similar to common law dower and also a distribu-
tive share were involved.18 6 The court reasoned that the contract to
leave an entire estate by will necessarily meant the net estate and
that the net estate could not be arrived at until all statutory interests
of the surviving spouse had been deducted. A strict logician might
contend that since the spouse's distributive share is ordinarily a
percentage of the net estate it is improper to say that that share
must be deducted before the net estate is ascertained. On the other
hand the view taken by the court in the Wides case is probably in
accord with the intent of the parties to the contract in most in-
stances. A contract for all or a fractional part of the property the
promisor might leave at death is a contract for an extremely un-
certain quantity. It leaves the promisor free to conduct his affairs
in a normal manner and assumes that obligations thus incurred in
good faith will be paid before there is anything left for the promisee.
The marital right, whether dower or a statutory share, would
184. Specific performance of such a contract cannot "be decreed with-
out sweeping aside, as of no moment or avail, the rights of the wife and
widow, vested under a contract most strongly favored by the law." Owens v.
McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 453, 45 Pac. 710 713 (1896) ; Van Duyne v. Vreeland,
12 N. J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142 (Ch. 1858) ; see Alban v. Schnieders, 67 Ohio
App. 397, 403, 34 N. E. 2d 302, 304 (1940) ; Fields v. Fields, 137 Wash. 592,
600-601, 243 Pac. 369, 371-372 (1926) (emphasizing the equities in favor of
the widow although the case could have been decided entirely on the ground
that the contract was not sufficiently proved).
Courts indicating that a promisor can in this manner disable himself
from leaving property to his spouse at his death have declared that entering
into a contract which accomplishes this result is so contrary to the normal
or usual customs of society that evidence of intent to do so must be very
clear. MacGowan v. Barber, 127 F. 2d 458, 463 (2d Cir. 1942) (seeming to
assume that if a contract to devi;e or bequeath an entire estate were clearly
established it would deprive the promisor of leaving any property at all to his
wife at death).
185. 299 Ky. 103, 184 S. W. 2d 579 (1944).
186. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 392.090 (1953). Although both dower and
distributive share were involved in this case there was no suggestion that
any situation calling for a distinction between the two was presented.
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probably be regarded as such an obligation by the average contract-
ing party.
This second line of reasoning suggested by the Wides case offers
no protection to the spouse where there is a contract to devise
specific property. Vhether or not specific enforcement of this kind
of a contract should be denied on the ground that it would be in-
equitable or unjust to a surviving spouse whose marriage to the
promisor took place subsequent to the formation of the contract
presents more of a problem. The argument on behalf of the spouse
would be less effective here than in case of a contract for an entire
estate since the policy against permitting a promisor to voluntarily
disable himself from ever conferring a marital property right upon
a possible future spouse could not be applied. Property acquired
after the marriage, or any property other than the specific real
estate, would not be subject to the contract anyway. Nevertheless
the rights of a promisee of a contract to devise a specific tract of
real estate have been held subordinate to the claim of a surviving
spouse for his statutory share even though the contract preceded
the marriage.8 7 A claim of dower would probably have been con-
sidered even stronger. Since the particular property concerned was
charged with the obligation of the contract at the time the marriage
was entered into such a decision with reference to either dower or
statutory share is difficult to justify. It represents an over zealous
effort to protect the property rights of a surviving spouse and has
apparently resulted in giving the spouse a property right which
was never really his.
The rights of the subsequent spouse are ordinarily raised as
matters of defense in equitable actions for specific performance
brought by the promisee. When the theory applied in granting the
defense is that specific performance is a discretionary remedy' s
which will not be applied where the result would be harsh or un-
fair, a question arises as to what further 'effect the contract might
have. It should be pointed out that no contention is made that the
contract itself is against public policy even where it is a contract for
an entire estate. The contract was valid and enforceable when made
187. Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S. W.
2d 905 (1939).
188. Although this is the usual or customary way of referring to the
action taken when the remedy of specific performance is denied on the
ground that the granting of such a remedy in the particular instance would
be inequitable, unjust, or unfair the term "discretionary remedy" can be
misleading. The discretion permitted is a judicial discretion. The rules for
determining when specific performance will be granted are rather well
established, and in many instances it could well be said that the remedy is
available as a matter of right. 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1136.
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but subsequent events were such as to make its enforcement in-
equitable to the extent to which marital rights of a subsequent
spouse are thereby affected. 3 " In all other respects the contract
continues valid and enforceable. 90 Courts granting this type of
relief are not called upon for any decision as to the effect of an
action at law by the promisee, but the impression left is that the
promisee would succeed if it could be assumed that a remedy at
law was available to him in he absence of the spouse's claim. In
most instances this would not curtail the protection available to the
spouse since this type of protection should be restricted to cases
involving contracts for entire estates, and the enforcement of con-
tracts for entire estates should be confined to equity.19 ' If the rights
of a spouse have intervened in such a way as to prevent full specific
enforcement the promisee should be permitted either to recover
the value of the consideration rendered'9 2 or to enforce specific
performance as to all property remaining after the claims of the
spouse have been satisfied. 9 3
If a contract to devise all or a fractional part of an estate is
construed as a contract relating to all that remains after the rights
of any possible surviving spouse have been satisfied no question
could arise concerning a possible difference in result depending
upon whether the action was at law or in equity.
The policy of favoring the rights of a surviving spouse should
be confined to the protection of dower, curtesy, distributive share,
or other marital right which the surviving spouse is ordinarily
privileged to enforce by electing to take against the will. The court
went beyond this boundary in In re Arland's Estate' where it
was held that the promisee was deprived of the fruits of his bargain
by a will which the promisor executed in favor of a wife he married
subsequent to the contract. The case is without foundation in either
189. "So, while this contract was not void, as against public policy, at
the time it was entered into, it must be held that the parties to it contracted in
view of the fact that a subsequent marriage ... might be consummated, and
that the effect of this marriage would be to compel a court of equity, injustice to the widow or children, to deny specific performance." Owens v.
McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 453-454, 45 Pac. 710, 713 (1896).
190. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S. W. 2d 579 (1944):
Ver Standig v. St Louis Union 'rust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S. W. 2d 905(1939).
191. See text at notes 44-46 snpra.
192. See Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 454, 45 Pac. 710, 713 (1896).
193. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S. W. 2d 579 (1944) ;
Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union 'rust Co., 344 Mo. 880, 129 S. W. 2d 905(1939).
194. 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924) ; cf. Sargent v. Corey, 34 Cal.
App. 193, 166 Pac. 1021 (1st Dist. 1917) (refusing to set aside an inter vivos
conveyance by the promisor to a subsequent wife).
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reason or authority. There is no public policy giving a wife any
preferred position as a gratuitous legatee of her husband."9 5
Courts extending protection to the marital rights of the sur-
viving spouse often emphasize the spouse's lack of knowledge of
the contract at the time of marriage. 9 Lack of notice of the con-
tract would appear to be a proper requirement in these cases, but
the extent to which constructive notice will be recognized, if at
all, appears rather uncertain. A wife was regarded as being without
notice even though the contract was on record as incorporated in a
divorce decree dissolving a prior marriage of the promisor.1 97 The
decision seems quite proper but in those jurisdictions recognizing
the claim of a subsequent spouse as a sufficient bar to an action for
specific performance of a contract to devise a particular tract of
real estate a more ticklish question could arise. Suppose the
promisee had the contract placed on record in the same manner as
a contract to convey. It would seem unreasonable to expect the
prospective spouse to examine such records. On the other hand a
good case could be made for the right of the promisee to protection
under the recording acts. No case has been found where this par-
ticular point has been argued. 98 An analogy supporting the claim
of the surviving spouse could possibly be drawn from other situa-
tions where it has been suggested that every contract to make a
will is subject to the implied contingency that the promisor might
later marry and thereby subject his estate to a claim of dower in
his wife.199 The implication of such a contingency as to both dower
195. Mayfield v. Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713 (1918).
196. Id. at 188, 77 So. at 714; Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 344 Mo. 880, 887, 129 S. W. 2d 905, 909 (1939).
197. Wides v. Wides' Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S. W. 2d 579 (1944).
Apparently actual knowledge by the widow is of no great significance in
Kentucky. When this case was later reinstated on the trial docket the
widow's adversaries offered to prove that she had actual knowledge of the
contract at the time of her marriage. The evidence was rejected. On appeal
this ruling was affirmed, the court taking the position that although the
widow's lack of knowledge was a matter of considerable equity the para-
mount or controlling factor was the policy of the law in favor of protecting
the widow. Since the court refused to even hear evidence on the point it is not
clear what was meant by the statement as to the widow's innocence being a
matter of considerable equity. Wides v. Wides, 300 Ky. 344, 188 S. W. 2d
471 (1945).
198. Such a contract was recorded in Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 98
Va. 515, 36 S. E. 992 (1900). The promisee was permitted to enforce the
contract but there was no indication that the court recognized any public
policy against the enforcement of contratts of this type anyway.
199. Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N. J. Eq. (1 Beasley) 142, 160 (Ch.
1858) (involving a contract for an entire estate). It might be argued that this
result necessarily follows if a subsequent marriage is contemplated and if
marriage is not contemplated the agreement probably violates the public policy
against contracts in restraint of marriage. See Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal.
444, 453-454, 45 Pac. 710, 713 (1896).
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and distributive share would seem reasonable where contracts for
entire estates are concerned. If the contract is for specific property
or a legacy of a certain amount the case becomes more questionable.
To subject all promisees of such contracts to the claims of possible
future spouses of the promisors for statutory shares would probably
be a deterrent to the use of this legal device and would work great
hardship in many instances. Claims of dower, being claims for life
estates only, might not have such an unfortunate effect, but it is
submitted that even the right of dower should not be recognized in
particular property the deceased spouse had in good faith contracted
to devise prior to the marriage.
Sometimes the making of the contract is accompanied by the
execution of a will carrying it into effect and the promisor subse-
quently marries and then dies without ever revoking the will. The
surviving spouse then claims her marital rights and pleads a statute
providing that a will is revoked by marriage of the testator. The
presence of such a statute has no effect upon the promisee's
rights.20 0 Courts arriving at this result usually say that these
statutes do not apply to wills executed pursuant to contract. A
better explanation is that the promisee's rights are derived through
a contract and are not dependent upon the will.
Of course where dower is recognized in equitable interests the
wife of the promisee takes dower in the promisee's right to have
land devised to him.2 01
Closely related to the problem concerning the contract which is
entered into prior to marriage is the effect of a spouse's contract
during coverture for a testamentary disposition to a third person.
It would seem that such a contract should be permitted under any
circumstances where an actual disposition is permitted. However,
it has been held that contracts for disposition of property by will
cannot be used to deprive the surviving spouse of any rights he or
she would have had had the contract not been made.20 2 The only
200. Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (1919); Mosloski v.
Gamble, 191 Minn. 170, 253 N. W. 378 (1934) ; Ralyea v. Venners, 155 Misc.
539, 280 N. Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
201. Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27, 16 At. 921 (Ch. 1889).
202. In Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920) the court
sought to justify its position on the theory that the promisee derived his
rights through the will. This rationalization would seem to break down
where no will is ever made but the promisee is nevertheless permitted to
enforce his contract. Such was the situation in Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275,
30 P. 2d 853 (1934) where it was held that the property taken by the promisee
should be included in the promisor's estate for the purpose of calculating the
spouse's statutory share. The court apparently assumed that it would be
against public policy to permit a contract performable at death to deprive
the wife of her statutory share in the husband's estate.
Where the surviving spouse is a party to a contract whereby the husband
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possible justification for such a position is an over zealous policy
in favor of giving special protection to the property rights of sur-
viving spouses, and even this reason appears rather spurious in so
far as it applies to property which could have been disposed of
without the consent of the spouse.
When a contract to devise or bequeath is entered into, the
promisee acquires certain rights and the promisor undertakes cer-
tain obligations. These rights and obligations continue in spite of
a subsequent marriage by the promisor. For the purpose of ascer-
taining marital rights a contract for all or a fractional part of an
estate has been construed as a contract for all or a fractional part of
what remains after the marital rights of any surviving spouse have
been provided for. If this construction is indulged in it is important
to emphasize that it is a construction to be applied for this purpose
and this purpose only. Aside from this possible solution there is
considerable conflict of authority upon the question whether, and
to what extent, a subsequent marriage is a sufficient intervening
equity to prevent the promisee from asserting his rights against a
surviving spouse who would otherwise have certain property rights
in the promisor's estate. The question is one of policy and the
answer depends upon the extent to which the rights of a surviving
spouse are to be regarded as superior to or subordinate to con-
tractual obligations created by the decedent prior to marriage.
Unless the contract is one which by its terms disables the promisor
from ever conferring a right to dower or a distributive share upon
a surviving spouse it is doubtful if a subsequent marriage should
hinder its enforcement.
Statutes of Limitations and Other Bars to Recovery
By its very nature a contract to make a will is one in which the
promisor has no obligation to perform prior to his death. Not only
is he permitted to postpone his performance until his death, but his
performance prior to that time is impossible. While it is true that
he must execute the will while he is still alive, it is also true that he
may revoke that will at any time and execute another one. His
obligation is that he die leaving in effect a will carrying out the
terms of the contract. Until he dies without leaving the necessary
will he has not committed a breach. The breach occurs at death
and the statute of limitations begins to run against the promisee's
and wife agree upon a manner of distributing their respective estates, the
survivor is not permitted to claim against a will carrying the contract into
effect. Luthy v. Seaburn, 242 Iowa 184, 46 N. W. 2d 44 (1931); Seat v.
Seat, 172 Tenn. (8 Beeler) 618, 113 S. W. 2d 751 (1938).
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cause of action at that time.2 03 This rule is not altered by the fact
that the promised devise or bequest is compensation for services
which were completed many years before the promisor's death.20 *
The application of the statute of limitations to contracts to de-
vise or bequeath is sometimes complicated by the promisor's express
repudiation prior to his death. If the repudiation is sufficiently
definite it might give the promisee an immediate cause of action in
quantum meruit on the theory of rescission or for damages on the
theory of an anticipatory breach.20 5 Since a possible cause of action
arises at the time of the repudiation it has been argued that the
period of the statute of limitations should be calculated from that
date. However, the promisee is not obligated to treat the contract as
rescinded or to pursue damages for the anticipatory breach. He
may at his election continue to keep the contract open until the
time set for the promisor's performance has arrived. That time is
fixed by the death of the promisor and if the promisee chooses to
keep the contract open until then the statute of limitations will not
begin to run prior to that date.2 0 6
Occasionally a distinction is made between an act of repudiation
and an act which disables the promisor from performing. The re-
sult is that in case of an ordinary act of repudiation if the promisee
refuses to recognize the repudiation and keeps the contract open
until the promisor's death the statute of limitations will not begin
to run against him until thai: time, 20° but if the promisor actually
conveys the property to a third person he is regarded as having
put performance beyond his power to control and the statute will
203. Troxel v. Childers, 299 Ky. 719, 187 S. W. 2d 264 (1945);
Succession of Oliver, 184 La. 26, 165 So. 318 (1936) ; Ellis v. Berry, 145
Miss. 652, 110 So. 211 (1926); Roth v. Roth, 340 Mo. 1043, 104 S. W. 2d
314 (1937); Poole v. Janovy, 1.31 Okla. 219, 268 Pac. 291 (1928); In re
Schoenbachler's Estate, 310 Pa. 396, 165 Atl. 505 (1933) ; Green v. Orgain,
46 S. W. 477 (Tenn. 1898).
204. Banks v. Howard, 117 Ga. 94, 43 S. E. 438 (1903) (holding that a
claim for interest upon the value of the services from the time the services
were performed may be allowed); Southard v. Curson, 13 Ohio App. 289
(1920).
205. Mug v. Ostendorf, 49 Ind. App. 71, 96 N. E. 780 (1911) ; Canada
v. Canada, 60 Mass. (6 Cushing) 15 (1850) ; Smith v. Long, 183 Okla. 441,
83 P. 2d 167 (1938) ; Moorhead v. Fry, 24 Pa. (12 Harris) 37 (1854).
206. Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 138 Pac. 728 (1914) ; Wold v.
Wold, 138 Minn. 409, 165 N. W. 229 (1917) ; Old Ladies Home Ass'n v. Hall,
212 Miss. 67, 52 So. 2d 650 (1951) ; Ga Nun v. Palmer, 202 N. Y. 483, 96 N. E.
99 (1911); McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N. C. 463,87 S. E. 244 (1915). Contra:
Church of Christ Home for Aged v. Nashville Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629, 202
S. W. 2d 178 (1947) ; see Bonesteel v. Van Etten, 20 Hun 468 (N.Y. 1880)
(actually based on insufficiency of evidence to prove the contract, but the
court indicated that recovery would have been barred by the statute of
limitations even if it had been clearly established).
207. Heery v. Reed, 80 Kan. 380, 102 Pac. 846 (1909).
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begin to run against the promisee's rights at the time of the con-
veyance.20 8 This position is highly questionable. The promisee
should not be required to pursue his action for bre ch.until the
time for performance has arrived.20 9  .
Where the promisor makes an outright repudiation and if the
promisee recognizes or accepts the repudiation and abandons the
contract, the statute of limitations will run from that- time.2 0 ,
Where the contract includes an agreemefnt by .the- promisor to
do some act at a time prior to his death and in addition to the
making of the will, additional complications sometimes arise: -Ga
Nun v. Paner2 l involved a contract to pay a definite suth mofnthly
until death and to leave still another sum by will. The promisor
repudiated the contract, ceased payments as they came due, and
then died without leaving the required will. In an action by the
promisee for the sum promised as a legacy- it was held that the
statute did not begin to run until the promisor's death.'Although no
claim was made for the monthly payments the court indicated that
the statute would begin to run as to them as they became due. The
decision has been criticized on the ground that it involved an im-
proper splitting of a cause of action. 212 Since no action was brought
until the final performance was due and since recovery of the sum
promised by will was the only relief sought, it does not appear that
the question as to the splitting of a cause of action was properly
presented or argued before the court. Even if payment of the
monthly sums had been asked for, the case could well have been
analyzed as one cause of action with part of the recovery barred.
A better explanation is that a promisee should be permitted to
bring action for the monthly payments as they become due and still
keep the contract open as to future performance. The promisor
should not be heard to complain since keeping the contract open
is to his advantage in that it gives him an opportunity to repent
and withdraw his repudiation at any time prior to the date for final
performance.
208. Engelbrecht v. Herrington, 101 Kan. 720, 172 Pac. 715 (1917).
209. For a case refusing to recognize this distinction and holding that
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the promisor's death even
though he makes wrongful inter vivos conveyances of the property see
Rogers v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 35, 138 Pac. 728 (1914). Even in Kansas
the position is somewhat uncertain. A more recent case involved a joint
promise by a husband and wife to leave their estate to their daughter. The
husband died first leaving an inconsistent will. It was held that the statute
of limitations did not begin to run against the daughter's right until the death
of the wife. Smith v. Nyburg, 136 Kan. 572, 16 P. 2d 493 (1932).
210. See McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244 (1915).
211. 202 N. Y. 483, 96 N. E. 99 (1911).
212. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 989.
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A further problem is raised when the contract is unenforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds or some similar reason but re-
covery for the value of the consideration given is permitted. The
consideration is usually services performed by the promisee and
in some instances the services are completed several years prior to
the promisor's death. If it is held that the oral contract is so far
void that evidence of it cannot be considered for any purpose other
than to show that the services were not gratuitously performed
and that the right to recover. in quantum meruit rests wholly on an
implied promise to compensate in some way, it would seem that
the period of the statute of limitations would necessarily run from
the time the services were rendered. A few cases have reached this
result.213 In some of them an effort has been made to draw a dis-
tinction between continuous and discontinuous services on the
theory that there is no implication of an agreement for periodic
payment; consequently, the statute of limitations will not begin
to run until there is a termination or interruption of the services.214
The better reasoned cases have taken the position that although
there can be no recovery upon the oral contract evidence of the
contact may be admitted to show that there was never any inten-
tion to compensate for the services prior to the death of the prom-
isor; and that if the promisee, in the absence of a repudiation by
the promisor, had brought action in quantum meruit prior to that
time evidence of the oral contract would have been a complete de-
fense. These cases have held that where the Statute of Frauds pre-
vents the enforcement of a contract to make a will the statute of
limitations will not begin to run against the right to recover in
quantum meruit until the death of the promisor.21 5 Failure to plead
the contract even though the action is in quantum meruit for the
value of services rendered sometimes frustrates the promisee's
recovery. If the claim indicates on its face that it is a mere claim
for services without reference to the promise to compensate by will
the statute will run from the time the services are performed.210
213. Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal. 2d 334, 84 P. 2d 146 (1938), noted, 27
Calif. L. Rev. 473 (1939) ; Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530, 179 N. W. 796 (1920);
Nelson v, Christensen, 169 Wis. 373, 172 N. W. 741 (1919).
214. See Taylor v. Thieman, 132 Wis. 38, 46, 111 N. W 229 232 (1907).
This distinction was subsequently repudiated. Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530,
535-536, 179 N. W. 796, 798 (1920).
215. Quirk v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 244 Fed. 682 (6th Cir.
1917) ; Costello v. Costello, 134 Conn. 536 59 A. 2d 520 (1948) ; Schempp v.
Beardsley, 83 Conn. 34, 75 AUt. 141 (19105 ; Poole v. Janovy, 131 Okla. 219,
268 Pac. 291 (1928) ; In re Schoenbachler's Estate, 310 Pa. 396, 165 AUt. 505(1933) ; Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S. W. 767 (1905).
216. Boggan v. Scruggs, 200 Miss. 747, 29 So. 2d 86 (1947). A claim
for interest from the date the services were performed is not repugnant to a
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Probate of an inconsistent will is no bar to enforcement of the
contract ;217 consequently, a statute regulating the time within
which probate may be contested does not properly affect the time
permitted for bringing an action on the contract. 21 8 However, Kan-
sas has taken the position that where an inconsistent will is pro-
bated a subsequent action on the contract is so similar to a con-
test of the will that it cannot be entertained unless it is brought
within the time permitted for will contests.21 This is entirely out
of harmony with the nature of the interests involved.
The effect of the promisee's acceptance of an inadequate pro-
vision in an inconsistent will220 and of his failure to object to the
probate of an inconsistent will-2' has already been discussed.
The question whether or not the promisee's rights are af-
fected by statutes regulating the time within which claims must
be filed against decedent's estates or fixing the time within which
action upon such claims must be brought has often been before the
courts. The specific nature of these statutes varies from state to
state so that no categorical answer can be given which can be sure
of application in every instance. Of course a statute could be drawn
in such a way as to affirmatively exclude from or include within its
application actions to enforce contracts to devise or bequeath. How-
ever, as the statutes actually exist they are sufficiently similar that
certain generalizations can be made. The proper solution is usually
found through an examination of the type of remedy pursued by
the promisee. If the action is at law for damages a claim must be
filed against the estate within the time allowed by the non-claim
statutes e -2 22 If an equitable remedy in the nature of specific per-
formance is sought the promisee is making no claim against the
estate and need not be bound by the non-claim statutes. He is claim-
ing title and may bring his action without ever filing a claim against
claim upon a promise to pay by will where the promise was to pay what the
services were worth. Reasonable value of the services would mean reason-
able value at the time of performance. It has been held that that should
entitle the promisee to actual value plus interest from the time of performance
until payment. Banks v. Howard, 117 Ga. 94, 43 S. E. 438 (1903).
217. Fuller v. Nelle, 12 Cal. App. 2d 576, 55 P. 2d 1248 (1st Dist.
1936) (holding that the probate court's determination that there was no
contract is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding); Phalen v. U. S.
Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 178, 78 N. E. 943 (1906) (promisee's rights not
affected by his failure to object to the inconsistent will).
218. Perkins v. Allen, 133 Wash. 455, 234 Pac. 25 (1925).
219. Koch v. Wolf, 146 Kan. 247, 69 P. 2d 1088 (1937).
220. See text at notes 73-82 supra.
221. See text at notes 109-112 supra.
'22. Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 Pac. 259 (1915) ; Grant v.
Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 29 Atl. 15 (1893) ; Estate of Len, 172 Wis. 530, 179
N. W. 796 (1920).
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the estate and after the time permitted for the filing of such claims
has expired. This result is reached wherever ground for equitable
jurisdiction is found whether that jurisdiction rests upon the fact
that- the contract is for all or a fractional part of the estate,2 23
specific real property,22 4 unique chattels, 225 or some other reason. 20
Sometimes the promisee is faced with an apparent dilemma as
to which remedy to pursue. The filing of a claim against the estate
might be construed as an election which will bar a subsequent action
for specific performance.2 2 7 If the remedy of specific performance
is pursued first it is possible that equitable relief will be denied
after the expiration of the period for filing claims against the estate.
Where specific performance of a contract to devise real estate was
denied because of inadequacy of the consideration but the time for
filing a claim against the estate had expired, equity retained juris-
diction to award compensaticn for the consideration rendered and
made the award a lien upon the land.228 Where the most desirable
remedy seems to be in equity but there is doubt as to its availability
it might be well to file a claim "without prejudice to any other
remedy" and then sue for specific performance while the claim is
still pending.229
Of course equitable relief is subject to the ordinary principles
of the doctrine of laches and may be barred by the promisee's failure
to pursue his cause with diligence. What constitutes due diligence
223. Furman v. Craine, 18 Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (2d Dist. 1912) ;
Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489 (1914) ; Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75
Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4 (1899) ; O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N. D. 346, 43 N. W.
2d 649 (1950).
224. Fred v. Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S. W. 155 (1912) ; Brickley v.
Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 149 At. 833 (1930) ; McCullough v. McCullough, 153
Wash. 625, 280 Pac. 70 (1929).
225. New England Trust Co. v. Spaulding, 310 Mass. 424, 38 N. E.
2d 672 (1941) (not a contract to make a will, but a contract giving an
option to buy at death).
226. Where specific performance of a contract involving certain real
estate was denied because of inadequacy of consideration equity retained
jurisdiction to give a judgment for value of the consideration rendered even
though the time for filing claims against the estate had passed. Selle v. Selle,
337 Mo. 1234, 88 S. W. 2d 877 (1935). In those few jurisdictions where it is
held that the promisee of a contract to bequeath a certain sum of money is
entitled to specific performance it necessarily follows that he has a right
of ownership in the estate and is not bound by the non-claim statutes. Erwin
v. Mark, 105 Mont. 361, 73 P. 2d 537 (1937).
227. There is no sound basis for forcing the promisee into an election
of this type. Since there is no inconsistency in the kinds of relief sought the
promisee should be permitted to file his claim against the estate, pursue his
legal remedy, and after failing there file his bill for specific performance.
Rowe v. Eggum, 107 Mont. 378, :37 P. 2d 189 (1938). The difficulty is that
when the promisee files a claim fcr the value of services rendered this might
be construed as a claim upon an implied promise and therefore a denial
of the express contract. Laird v. Laird, 115 Mich. 352, 73 N. W. 382 (1897).
228. Sellev. Selle, 337 Mo. 1234, 88 S. W. 2d 877 (1935).
229. Fleming v. Dillon, 370 Ill. 325, 18 N. E. 2d 910 (1938).
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must be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding each par-
ticular case and might be affected by the nature of the transaction,
the position of the parties with respect to the property, the inter-
vention of the rights of third persons, or other factors. If the
promisee is ejected from the premises by the heirs of the promisor
and then delays action for nine years proper diligence has not been
exercised..2 30 On the other hand a rather extended delay might be
justified if it is for good reason. In Evans v. Moore231 the promisor
devised the property to a third person who had made an unenforce-
able promise to transfer it to the promisee when the promisee
showed more signs of business responsibility. The promisee knew
of the understanding and believed it would be carried out. Although
he failed to bring his action until after the death of the promisor's
devisee his right to specific performance was upheld. To refuse
equitable relief prior to the expiration of the period of the statute
of limitations would be highly unjustified unless substantial rights
of third persons had intervened. 23 2
The rules restricting the promisee's right to recover for breach
of a contract to make a will are basically the same as the funda-
mental principles restricting recovery upon contract actions gen-
erally. When the problems are approached with that point of view
and from the premise that it is a contract that is being dealt with
the difficulties experienced in finding solutions are considerably,
reduced.
230. Young v. Young, 45 N. J. Eq. 27, 16 AtI. 921 (1889).
231. 247 Ill. 60, 93 N. E. 118 (1910).
232. Furman v. Craine, 18 Cal. App. 41, 121 Pac. 1007 (1912).
